BX 



pi 

mm 

IP 



<C Cere <L CC - < CK «t c 



HI 



c^£<rc3 



"<X~ r^rceT<r' «c<5 . 

, rc ^eveser <■<-. ^.<"~<l«c «" <fc 
^e<<^C*C «C'< COs:<C~«S£ 
■ <c *C otr >C c ••<••<" "<r^c:; ^r <r< 

A'cc '^r- 3- 

^' c: •. ' 

crrr ^r<gcr ■ ^ ac >5 
tcr <rc!^ - c <3C.a <«Tv - ^ 



Kr'i r^^^^scc <5r^p^ 



<:> -f- S: 



'ere 

r ~<-< r «gl 



j- : > ^ « 



(^-irr<r 5 <r«^3r' <n<isc^ <x. 



V C^ 



*jt_^8^fcxr'<ri.^iE^r <rcc«- 
W ^^^^^ %3f <: 



v 

<.. C/. <:: ^CT 

c c: ' c «ac^ 



■ce. C <^<: ;x 

i> < cr «<r- 

X ' ' C c 

<: c- • < c 
< - < < C . ^^5 tC c: 

: Cr «€C£vC c 

cc «^<c c: 

cc «: cc<: 

^ ^cCr 

rr^C«<CC 
r r^CJ^<frr< 

-c^fec^S 

^XCCjC.^^ 
C. CC4Ls^ fC - 



ON 



BR WARE'S ANSWER. 



/ 

BY LEONARD WOODS D. D. 

ABBOT PROF. OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN THEOL. SEM. ANDOVEft, 

ANDOVER : 
PUBLISHED AND FOR SALE BY MARK NEWMAN. 

flagg and gould printers. 
Sept. 1822. 



, W7ZS- 



The first edition of Dr Woods^s reply was published Sept. 1321. In May, 
1322, Dr Ware published an Answer. The principal points in this An- 
swer are noticed in the folloioing remarks. 



The design of this pamphlet is to make a few remarks on 
Dr Ware's Answer to my Reply. As this discussion has been al- 
ready carried to a great length, and as 1 am unwilling to burden 
the patience, or abuse the candor, either of my opponent or of the 
public ; I shall confine my remarks to those parts of the subject 
which appear most important, aiming to be as concise as possible, 
consistently with doing any degree of justice to what I believe to 
be the cause of truth. 

The system of divine truth, emanating from the mind of God, and 
agreeing with his immutable perfections, must be consistent with 
itself. But in every erroneous system, there are inconsistencies. 
Some of these arise from the union in the same system of different 
and opposite forms of error ; but a greater number arise from the 
mixture of certain portions of truth with error. In order that 
any system of error may have a plausible appearance and an 
extensive circulation, it is found indispensable that it should con- 
tain a considerable portion of truth, sufficient at least to afford 
some satisfaction to reason and some relief to conscience. But 
however skilfully truth may be mixed with error, and whatever 
plausibility may be given to a system of error by the truths which 
lie on its surface ; it will always be found that such a mixture oc- 
casions a variety of inconsistencies which no art can long conceal. 

I consider the general scheme of doctrine held by Unitarians, 



4 



REMARKS ON DR WARE^S ANSWER. 



as radically erroneous. And yet, as it is exhibited by my antago- 
nist, and by all other Unitarians, it asserts many and very impor- 
tant truths. This circumstance, though in one point of view it 
becomes a recommendation of Unitarianism, really occasions an 
abundance of those inconsistencies with which the scheme is en- 
cumbered. The inconsistencies so apparent in Dr Ware's reason- 
ing- are, in my opinion, to be charged to the scheme itself. They 
are inseparable from it. No man, I think, can undertake its de- 
fence, without finding himself entangled in an endless train of self- 
contradictions. 

Dr Ware signifies that " the apparent inconsistencies and ab- 
surdities" which have been u fastened" upon him, do not affect 
" the truth of the points at issue ;" that they show, " not the 
weakness of the cause, but that its strength has not been fully 
displayed ;" and that they are, " in general, if not in every in- 
stance, apparent only." He lets us know, in several places, that 
he thinks more highly of Unitarianism, than of his own skill in de- 
fending it, and rather chooses that any reproach should fall upon 
him, as a disputant, than upon his cause. But on all these points, 
my views and feelings are different from his. And in particular, 
it is my serious conviction, that the inconsistencies and absurdities 
which were pointed out in my Reply, are real ; that they af- 
fect the truth of the points at issue ; and that Dr Ware's Answer, 
instead of removing them, adds to their number. 

I now proceed, though with all due respect for the good sense 
and good temper of my opponent, to offer the following remarks 
upon what appears to me exceptionable in his publications, par- 
ticularly the last. 

USE OF THE WORDS INNOCENCE AND PURITY. 

There can be no doubt or difficulty in regard to the meaning 
of these terms, if we consider the subject to which they are in 
any case applied, and keep in mind the proper staudard of judging. 
But on this point, 1 have little to add to what I said in my Reply. 
We sometimes give the name of innocence to the harmlessness of 
certain animals, meaning surely nothing of moral nature. When 
a man is free from particular crimes laid to his charge, we say, 
he is innocent, that is, in respect to those particular crimes. But 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



s 



when innocence or purity is attributed to man, considered as a mor- 
al agent, and under obligations to obey the divine law, nothing 
can be meant but holiness. Nothing short of this can be regarded 
as innocence or purity, in relation to such a subject. But this is 
the subject and the only subject with which we are concerned in 
this discussion ; and it is the subject to which the word generally 
relates, as used in the Scriptures. Now let us see in what sense 
Dr Ware uses the word innocence or purity in relation to this very 
subject. He says, human beings come into existence " innocent, 
or pure." He shows what he means, when in the same general 
statement, he represents them as " without any greater bias to 
sin than to holiness ; as no more inclined to vice than to virtue. 1 ' 
It is clearly implied, that they are innocent, though really inclin- 
ed to vice, if they are no more inclined to it, than to virtue. 
He says in his Answer, his object was to prove that man by 
nature is 4i innocent, not totally depraved.' 1 ' 1 It- seems then, as he 
plainly shows afterwards, that innocence, in his sense of the word, 
belongs to those who, in a moral and religious view, have a mix- 
ed character, provided there is not in the mixture a greater quan- 
tity of evil, than of good. Now this representation, compared 
with what Dr Ware advances in his Letters, pp. 24, 25, would lead 
to the conclusion, that men in general, yea, the worst of men, are 
innocent; and that, in this respect, there is no essential difference 
between them and little children. For he says "that in by far 
the largest part of human beings, the just, and kind, and benevo- 
lent dispositions prevail beyond measure over the opposite; and 
that even in the worst men, good feelings and principles are pre- 
dominant, and they probably perform in the course of their lives 
many more good, than bad actions." If it is then Dr Ware's opin- 
ion of men in general, and even of the worst, that they are " not 
totally depraved," and are " no more inclined to vice than to vir- 
tue ;" he must of course consider them all as innocent. 

If my readers should think I must be" mistaken as to the real 
meaning of Dr Ware, let them look at his Answer, p. 9, and they 
will see that he does actually attribute to those whom he calls in- 
nocent, just such a mixture of virtue and vice. After laying down 
his position " that human beings come into existence innocent, and 
without any greater bias to sin than to holiness ; not inclined to 
holiness only, nor to holiness more than to sin," he says ; " if this 



6 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



be the truth, the earliest indications of character will be of a mixed 
nature ; and at an early period, as soon indeed as the child be- 
comes capable of moral action, we shall be likely to find in its dis- 
positions and in its character, as much of that which is good as that 
which is evil." This is brought forward as an exhibition in early 
life of that very innocence, which he says belongs to human beings 
at first. That he means to ascribe innocence to those, who ex- 
hibit this mixture of good and evil, is perfectly manifest from his 
Letters, p. 26, and else-where, and from his Answer, p. 10. Here 
he reminds us, that when he had occasion to speak of the good 
dispositions of children, that is, of their innocence, purity, simplicity, 
&c. he meant, not that they are holy by nature, but that they are 
not totally depraved. And as he asserts of all men, that they are 
not totally depraved, but have a preponderance of good ; he must, 
to be consistent, regard them all as innocent and pure. 

I think, however, that the sense in which Dr Ware seems here 
to use the word innocence, is different from that in which it has 
commonly been used by those who deny native depravity. When 
they assert the natural innocence of man, they mean that he is 
free from every moral taint, entirely free from sinful propensity, and 
not that he is of a mixed character. It is plain that this was the 
prevailing sense of Dr Ware himself, in his first publication. He 
says that " man is by nature innocent and pure, free from all moral 
corruption.' 1 '' But now he tells us abundantly, that when he speaks 
of the characteristics of children, and of the earliest indications of 
their disposition and character, he means to prove only that they 
are not totally depraved ; clearly implying that, though they are 
partially depraved, and exhibit a mixed character, they are still 
innocent ; — innocent, though inclined to vice as much as to virtue ; 
pure, though partly polluted ; pure in a mixed sense, having as 
much of good as of evil, and as much of evil as of good. 

1 hope that Dr Ware, on a careful review, will be convinced, 
that there is some radical error in a system which leads him into 
so many strny paths, and involves him thus in greater and greater 
difficulties. How must it appear to the reader, and how must it 
appear to Dr Ware himself, to find, that he has spoken of the in- 
nocence and purity of those who have a mixed character; — the in- 
nocence and purity of the very, worst of men, because, as he thinks, 
though they are inclined to vice, they are no more inclined to vice 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



7 



than to virtue. In his reasoning on this subject, he seems to have 
forgotten, that man, as a moral agent, is under obligation perfectly 
to obey the law of God, and that he never can be considered as 
completely innocent and pure, unless he yields the whole obedi- 
ence which is required ; nor in any degree innocent and pure, 
without some degree of holy obedience. 

Dr Ware will perceive what strange inconsistencies attend his 
use of words, when he looks over some of his pages, and finds 
that he has expressly asserted the necessity of regeneration for 
those who are, in his view, innocent and pure. It is one of his 
positions, that those very beings whom he denominates innocent 
and pure, have not that holiness which is necessary to their being 
Christians, and therefore that they must be born again* He fre- 
quently suggests that the innocence, purity, and simplicity of little 
children are not moral qualities, that they imply no holiness and 
no moral character. But in his Answer, pp. 14, 15, he shows 
himself quite dissatisfied with the same suggestion in my Reply. 
I had endeavoured to show that what Christ says of children does 
not imply that they have " any moral excellence, like the moral 
excellence of Christians, ,? and that the amiable qualities belonging 
to them, as innocence, purity, &c. are natural, not moral qualities. 
His whole argument in opposition to this implies, that the good 
qualities of children, their innocence, purity, &c. must be moral 
qualities, like the moral qualities peculiar to Christians. In short, 
he seems to say, they are moral qualities, or they are not, just as 
the different and clashing parts of his system happen to require. 
I attribute this, not to any intention of his, but to the perplexity 
in which he is involved by the defence of his system. 

This confusion in the use of words might have been prevent- 
ed, had Dr Ware fixed in his mind, that the divine law is the stan- 
dard of morai good, and then carefully inquired whether the qual- 
ities of human nature referred to, are what that law requires. 
But he seems to have turned off his eye from this simple and per- 
fect standard, and to have framed his whole argument on other 
principles. 



REMARKS ON DR WARE 7 S ANSWER. 



USE OF THE WORD HOLINESS. 

Divines and all Christians, so far as I know, use the word holi- 
ness to denote moral excellence, or conformity to the law of God. 
This is its common as well as its technical sense. But in his An- 
swer, p. 13, Dr Ware informs us that he did not mean to use it 
in this sense. Let us inquire how he does use it. In his Letters 
he says : u If children are depraved, destitute of holiness^ averse to 
all good, &lc. how could our Savior declare respecting them, of 
such is the kingdom of God''' This, which Dr Ware now looks up- 
on as an " unlucky" passage, I considered as clearly signifying 
that children are not destitute of holiness, and so as contradicting 
what he says his scheme every where implies, namely, that men 
by nature do not possess personal holiness. In answer to this, he 
very frankly says, if we will insist that he must have used the 
word holiness in its technical sense, the charge of inconsistency 
will lie against him. I would be far from taking any advantage of 
an " unlucky phrase," which he used inadvertently, and now re- 
views with regret. I am willing to admit any explanations, and 
to understand the word holiness, as he would have me understand 
it. As he used the word in his Letters, p. 30, it must have denot- 
ed that holiness, which is a qualification for heaven. His argu- 
ment required this. He now allows, p. 1 3, that he " used a phrase 
which expresses a meaning, that he did not intend to express." 
He plainly signifies that by holiness he did not mean holiness. 
He tells us finally, that " the sense, whether proper or improper, 
in which the word was evidently used, implies no contradiction." 
But I still have a difficulty in getting at a consistent sense. For if 
by holiness he does not mean holiness, but something else; he 
does indeed avoid one contradiction, — the one upon which he par- 
ticularly had his eye ; but in avoiding this, he runs upon others. 
For immediately after, p. 14, he labors to establish a position di- 
rectly contrary to what he says his main position was in regard to 
the very subject. In my Reply I considered the passage, Matt, 
xix. 24, as not implying " that little children possess any moral 
excellence or goodness like that of Christians." He here opposes 
this opinion. He adduces several arguments against it ; and, in the 
whole course of his remarks, endeavours to show, that the amia- 
ble qualities of children, so often mentioned, are moral qualities. 



REMARKS 0N T DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



s 



and that the innocence , purity, veracity, &c. which appear in them, 
are of the same nature with those attributes of Christians which 
are denoted by the same names, and of course, that they have 
real moral excellence, or goodness. Or more briefly thus. In p. 13, 
he says, he never meant to assert, that children have any holiness 
" in the technical sense." But in p. 14, he expressly tells us, 
they have ''good qualities." Now if by u good qualities," he 
means holiness in the technical sense, that is, the moral excellence 
which prepares men for heaven, there is a plain contradiction. 
If he does not mean this, he means nothing which is pertinent to 
the argument. But after all, it is evident he does mean holi- 
ness in the technical sense. For his whole reasoning, pp. 14, 36, re- 
quires this. And besides, he gives his opinion, p. 1 1, that those 
same good qualities of children make " a part, and an important 
part of that character, which constitutes conformity to the moral 
law, and renders him to whom it belongs holy" This is surely 
saying, that, children have that which is of the nature of holiness. 
And again in the same page, he comes near charging me with 
confounding " physical and moral qualities," and agreeing with 
Hume and Godwin, because I contended that the natural qualities 
of children have nothing in them of a moral nature, and nothing- 
like the moral excellence of Christians. Here again we see that, 
according to the plain import of Dr Ware's expressions, little 
children naturally possess real holiness. If this is not his opinion, 
he will, I apprehend, think it proper to acknowledge, that in his last 
publication, as well as the former, he has occasionally used an 
" unlucky phrase." And, if I mistake not, he always will use 
unlucky phrases, and run into palpable inconsistencies in his rea- 
soning, so long as he labors to defend a scheme of religion, which 
measures moral character and actions by any rule, except the per- 
fect law of God. The fault is evidently in his religious system ; 
and while he adheres to that, he must find difficulties unavoida- 
ble. 

One more remark. It seems to me that the whole controver- 
sy, as Dr Ware conducts it, turns very much on this single word, 
and that what gives his reasoning at first view, such an appear- 
ance of plausibility, is the wonderful facility with which this word, 
holiness, continually shifts its meaning. If human nature is to be 
described in opposition to the Orthodox doctrine of depravity, 



10 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



a variety of amiable and excellent qualities are attributed to it, 
and the whole train of thought and drift of reasoning imply, 
that children have that moral purity or holiness, which makes 
them like real Christians, and fits them for the kingdom of heav- 
en. But if this representation is to be reconciled with other ac- 
knowledged principles, particularly with the necessity of regener- 
ation asserted by our Savior ; then the whole subject puts itself 
into a new attitude ; the amiable qualities of children are not of 
a moral nature ; they do not constitute personal holiness, or posi- 
tive virtue ; and those who possess them must be born again be- 
fore they can be qualified for the kingdom of heaven. 

DR. WARE'S MAIN POINT ON THE SUBJECT OF DEPRAVITY. 

Dr Ware often asserts in his Answer, that the question at is- 
sue between us is not whether man is by nature the subject of 
some degree of depravity, but whether he is totally depraved. To 
this statement of the subject I have no objection ; and am willing 
to understand him as directing his argument from the natural char- 
acteristics of children, against the doctrine of total depravity. But 
what is the doctrine of total depravity ? It is, that man is by na- 
ture wholly destitute of holiness, and that all his moral affections and 
actions are sinful. The doctrine allows that man has by nature 
many appetites., passions, and affections, which are not sinful, be- 
ing not of a moral nature. I said expressly in my Reply, that the 
amiable qualities of children, which Dr Ware makes so much of, 
are no part and no indication of depravity. But I must say too, 
they are not holiness. And if this can be made to appear, the con- 
troversy is ended. For our doctrine of total sinfulness does not 
imply, that sinfulness is mixed with no other dispositions or affec- 
tions whatever. It only implies that it is mixed with none which 
are holy. It admits that moral depravity in man may be mixed 
with any thing but real holiness. It excludes none of the quali- 
ties ever found in those who are destitute of holiness, whether 
children or men. 

The whole force of Dr Ware's argument against total deprav- 
ity lies in " the amiable traits and virtuous tendencies" of chil- 
dren. The only question is, whether these amiable traits are holy. 
If they are, they disprove our doctrine. If they are not holy, 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER* 



11 



they do not disprove it. Now I could quote a multitude of passa- 
ges from Dr Ware's two publications, which assert or imply that 
those things which he mentions as belonging to children, are not 
holy. And I could prove the same thing, and I think it has already 
been proved, from the word of God. If then any one supposes 
that Dr Ware's argument above mentioned, is valid, it must 
be because he misapprehends the Orthodox doctrine, or the na- 
ture of the argument. Dr Ware thinks it a singular concession 
for an Orthodox man to make, " that beings destitute of all good 
and inclined only to evil," are yet by nature possessed of those 
amiable qualities which are called innocence, kindness, gratitude, 
&c. But it will cease to appear singular, if he will only take into 
view, first, that our doctrine respects man's moral affections, or 
his moral and religious character merety ; and secondly, that the 
amiable qualities of childhood, by whatever name they may be 
called, constitute no part of moral and religious character, and of 
course make no mixture which our doctrine denies. 

Dr Ware's answer, Lett. I. and II, contains a great variety of 
passages, on which I should freely animadvert, were it not incon- 
sistent with the limits I have prescribed to myself in this Pam- 
phlet, and were it not perfectly easy for the intelligent reader to 
see what influence the remarks already made, must have upon 
every thing there offered against the Orthodox doctrine. 

The suggestion of Dr Ware at the close of Lett. II. is of a 
practical nature, and ought not to pass unnoticed. He says, " If 
parents find it impossible to persuade their children to love, fear, 
and obey God, &c. they are certainly called upon to examine 
most seriously, whether the cause of it is not to be found in the 
representations which have been given them of the character and 
government of God." 

I admit that they ought to inquire. But if it should be found 
that the more truly and faithfully the character and government 
of God are represented, the more distant is the human heart 
from love and obedience ; it would be nothing different from what 
occurred under the personal ministry of Christ. 

DR WARE'S ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT DEPRAVITY IS NOT INNATE. 



I endeavoured to make it appear, in my Reply, Chap. III. that 



12 REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 

all the circumstances which lead us to consider any property of 
man as natural or innate, manifestly attend moral depravity. I 
shall remark, in few words, on the manner in which Dr Ware at- 
tempts to prove my reasoning inconclusive* 

The first circumstance of human depravity which I mentioned 
as proving it to be natural, was its universality. Dr Ware thinks 
it is not true that all have sinned in such a sense u as implies a 
character." " No reason," he says, u can be assigned, why a sin- 
gle sin should constitute a sinner, any more than a single act of 
virtue should give the character of a virtuous man ;" and then 
proceeds to express the same views as before, respecting the mix- 
ed character of every human being. 

On this 1 offer the following remarks. The divine law is per- 
fect, and treats all its subjects according to what their characters 
really are. If that law pronounces any human being to be a sin- 
ner, and aims its threats against him, as a sinner ; we are surely 
to consider him as having, in reality, the character of a sinner. 
Now what does the law say ? u The soul that sinneth, it shall 
die."' Is it said, that a single sin does not constitute a sinner in 
the sense of the divine law ? But the apostle says, " he who of- 
fends in one point, is guilty of all which must imply at least, 
that he, who commits a single sin, shows that he has the charac- 
ter of a sinner, and must be treated by the law as a sinner. How 
is it in regard to the civil law, which prohibits murder on the pen- 
alty of death ? If a man, from malice and revenge, deliberately 
commits an act of murder; does not that one act expose him to 
be treated as a 'murderer ? And unless he gives good evidence of 
a thorough reformation, does not that one act give him, and per- 
manently too, the character of a murderer? Dr Ware, in his re- 
marks on this point, has his eye upon the same mixture of quali- 
ties, so often mentioned above. But it must be remembered, that 
it is a mixture, of which holiness has not been proved to constitute 
any part. This applies also to his remarks on the second circum- 
stance mentioned in my Reply ; namely, that the indications of cZe- 
pravity appear early. He says there are other things of an oppo- 
site character, which appear early too, referring still to the same 
amiable characteristics of childhood. But those characteristics, 
however amiable and useful, cannot be proved to be of a mor- 
al nature, or to constitute any degree of conformity to God's 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



13 



law. It is true, the want or extinction of them, arising as it 
must from an extraordinary degree of wickedness, will form an 
article in the catalogue of sins ; and so would the extinction of 
any of the natural appetites or faculties, if it should result from 
the same cause. But because the extinction of any natural appe- 
tite or faculty of man by means of moral corruption, is to be ac- 
counted as a sin ; it does not surely follow that the existence of 
that appetite or faculty is to be accounted holiness. 

Another circumstance which I mentioned as distinguishing 
those things which are innate, was, that " thej r cannot be traced 
to any change in the constitution of man's nature subsequent to 
his birth." Dr Ware says, " the w r hole reasoning of Dr Woods on 
the subject proceeds on the supposition, either that I had assert- 
ed, or that the doctrine which I advanced did imply, such a change. 
You will therefore be not a little surprised to find, that no such 
change in the constitution of our nature is either asserted or im- 
plied in all that I have said." Now let us see what is asserted or 
implied in Dr Ware's Letters. In page 27, speaking of some of 
the amiable dispositions of little children, he says ; " what I have 
stated, I am persuaded is the general character, until the disposi- 
tion and tendency of nature has been changed by education, example, 
and circumstances." It is here implied that the corruption of 
character, which after a while appears in children, is to be account- 
ed for by a change which education, example and circumstances 
produce in the disposition and tendency of their nature. And yet he 
thinks that no such change is either asserted or implied in all that 
he has said. In his explanation, Answer, p. 32, he signifies 
that when he speaks of a change in the disposition and ten- 
dency of nature, he must be understood to mean something quite 
different from a change in the moral constitution of man, or a 
change in his nature. But he does not tell us nor attempt to tell 
us what he does mean, nor what distinction can be made be- 
tween " a change in the constitution of man's nature," and "a change 
in the disposition and tendency of nature.'''' — But without any re- 
ference to what Dr Ware had said respecting a change of nature 
or of moral constitution, it was quite to my purpose to prove de- 
pravity to be native, by the consideration, that it is not owing to 
any change of nature subsequent to birth. For clearly, if man- 
kind are depraved, as DrWare allows, and if depravity is not 



14 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



owing to any change of moral constitution or character subsequent 
to their birth, their depravity must be native. 

The fourth circumstance I mentioned to show that depravity 
is native, was, that it is spontaneous. Dr Ware, p. 33, adverts im- 
mediately to the same amiable affections of children, and asks, 
whether they are not spontaneous also. I have said already that 
they are. But they are not moral qualities, and have not a holy 
character, and cannot be alleged as proofs of natural holiness, or 
of any thing contran r to our doctrine of native depravity. 

The next reason which I gave for thinking moral evil natural) 
was, M that it is hard to be eradicated." Dr Ware's repty is, 
" that the same maj r be said with equal truth of the good affec- 
tions and principles of our nature/' I acknowledge it and have 
before acknowledged it to be so, with respect to what he calls 
the good affections and principles of our nature. Those amia- 
ble qualities have all the marks of being natural. In this we 
are agreed. But I cannot agree with him, if he so far forgets 
himself as to consider them to be either holiness, or indications 
of holiness. 

My sixth reason was the certainty that every child born into the 
world tssill be a sinner. Dr Ware replies thus. " If the word sin- 
ner is here used as a designation of character, and it be intended 
to assert that the prevailing disposition, affections &c. will univer- 
sally be sinful, it is not true." On this subject I am well aware 
that we are too far apart to reason together, with any prospect of 
coming to the same conclusion. For my opponent denies not only 
that all men, but that an^v men, however bad, have a prevalence 
of sinful dispositions. If he is right, there is a preponderance of 
moral good in all. And if I should admit this, I should adopt the 
same conclusion as he does respecting man's natural character. Dr 
Ware thinks a paragraph which I wrote on this subject implies, that 
the Orthodox wish to prove merely, " that sin is natural to man 
in the same sense that holiness is." " If this is the case," he says, 
" there is no need of controversy." But this is not exactly the 
case. I maintain that sin is natural to man in the same sense and 
only in the same sense with those appetites and affections which 
Dr Ware calls holiness. But what he calls holiness would be 
something' quite d fierent according to our standard. 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



13 



CONSISTENCY OF DEPRAVITY WITH THE MORAL CHARACTER OF GOD. 



On this subject I have but few additional remarks to make. In 
my Reply, p. 62, I mentioned it as a particular fault in the mode 
of reasoning adopted by Unitarians, " that they consider a difficul- 
ty which they are not able to solve, as sufficient to disprove a 
doctrine, supported by clear and conclusive evidence." DrWare 
seems to wish me " to refer to the book and page where such an 
assertion is to be found." I acknowledge I can refer to no book 
where Unitarians avow this principle in so many words. Nor is 
it probable they would do this, as it would be in fact the same as 
to own themselves guilty of a great fault in reasoning. But I 
could refer to many a book, and particularly to the one to which 
I have offered a reply, and to the part of it which relates to this 
very subject, as exhibiting the very mode of reasoning here com- 
plained of. The evidence which supports the doctrine of natural 
depravity is. in my view, clear and conclusive ; and I think it would 
be so in Dr Ware's view, were it not for certain difficulties, which 
he is not able to solve. Those difficulties are manifestly consid- 
ered by him as sufficient to disprove the doctrine. Be sure, he 
would not, in this state of mind, say that the evidence in support 
of the doctrine is clear and conclusive. And why ? Not because 
there is really any defect in the evidence, but because he suf- 
fers the difficulties so to influence his mind, as entirely to 
prevent him from feeling the weight of evidence. This is what 
often occurs in regard to the most important subjects in Ethics and 
Theology. Men acquire a habit of looking more at the various 
difficulties which attend moral and religious trulh, than at the sub- 
stantial evidence which supports it. In consequence of this habit, 
that evidence which, in other circumstances, would appear per- 
fectly clear and conclusive, loses in their minds all its clearness 
and force. Thus it is in fact the consideration of difficulties, which 
leads them to reject the truth. This is a fault in the habit of 
mind which Dr Ware has doubtless had occasion to notice, and 
which must be considered very hazardous to the cause of truth. 
For there is really no doctrine in Christianity or in natural theol- 
ogy, which is not attended with difficulties. And we learn from 
the case of Hume and many others, and we may perhaps confirm 



\6 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



the lesson by some portions of our own experience, that there 
maybe such a habit of dwelling upon difficulties in relation to any 
subject whatever, as will be likely to end in a skeptical state of 
mind, if not in a decided rejection of the truth. It appears evi- 
dent to me, that something* like what 1 have now described, has 
had a great effect upon the reasoning- and faith of Unitarians, in 
regard to the subjects of the present controversy. 

Dr Ware, p. 41, objects to my leaving naked suppositions, on 
the ground of which natural depravity and divine goodness may 
be made to appear consistent. As to this I beg lea ye to say, that, 
although his asserting the impossibility of our making any such 
supposition, was a sufficient reason why I should show that a sup- 
position of that kind could be made ; yet I did not, as he intimates, 
leave naked suppositions, without offering any proof. It will be 
seen in chap. 4. that I first exhibited a probable solution of the 
difficulty which Dr Ware had suggested, as to the consistency of 
depravity with the divine attributes, and then proceeded express- 
ly to show, by several facts, that the solution I had given was 
conformable to truth, and ought to be satisfactory. It cannot be 
necessary that I should repeat here what I offered in that chap- 
ter. I would merely request the reader to see for himself, wheth- 
er I left the subject as Dr Ware's remarks seem to imply. 

I am charged with evading the point at issue, and confounding 
the beginning of sin with its origin ; things which Dr Ware con- 
siders as very different. He says " the question is not at what time, 
whether earlier or later, the commencement of sin may be consis- 
tent with the moral perfections of God ; but whether its originat- 
ing in a nature wholly corrupt, in natural affections wholly wrong, 
and an inclination only to evil, in connexion with the other doc- 
trines of Calvinism be consistent V Dr Ware has indeed a 

right to introduce a question in such a general and complex form. 
But it is not the form in which I have ever attempted to discuss 
it, or in which it is capable of discussion. The method which I 
have adopted, and I think it the only one which in any such case 
promises success, is, to take up convenient parts of the whole 
complex subject, and discuss them first separately, then in their re- 
lations to each other. In the present case, I inquire first, whether the 
Orthodox doctrine of depravity is consistent with the divine attri- 
butes. After that I proceed to inquire, whether the doctrine of 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER, 



if 



Election is consistent ; then the doctrine of divine influence, and 
the doctrine of endless punishment. If I find nothing in the sev- 
eral parts which constitute the system, and nothing in their rela- 
tion to each other, inconsistent with the divine perfections, I con- 
clude there is nothing inconsistent in the whole system. And 
I maintain that we cannot properly discuss any complex sub- 
ject, without thus analyzing it, and considering its constituent parts 
by themselves. 

The present question is, whether sin's " originating in a 
nature wholly corrupt, in natural affections wholly wrong, and 
an inclination only to evil," is consistent with the divine attri- 
butes. But what is a corrupt nature ? What are wrong affec- 
tions? What is an inclination to evil? Are these anything but 
sin ? When Dr Ware speaks of the source or origin of sin as 
something distinct from sin itself ; if he means the outward act of 
sin, or visible transgression merely, the distinction he makes is 
very proper. Outward, visible sin springs from inward sin ; sin 
in the life from sin in the heart. But sin in its highest sense is 
sin in the hearty that is, wrong affection, corrupt inclination. There 
cannot then be any doubt, that sin originates in wrong affec- 
tion, or a nature morally corrupt. For it is perfectly obvi- 
ous it can originate no where else. It is impossible to form a 
conception of such a thing as sin, which does not begin in the 
heart, or in moral inclination or affection. So that no man can 
make a distinction that is intelligible, between that which in the 
most proper sense is sin, and corrupt affection or inclination. Now 
the question, whether sinfulness or depravity is innate, is, in my 
view, the same as the question, whether it is coeval with man's 
moral existence, or whether it belongs to his moral nature from 
the first? And this is the same as the question, at what time, 
whether at the beginning of man's existence, or afterwards, sin 
commences ? I can see no other meaning in the question as to 
native depravity. Our doctrine is, that sin or moral evil belongs 
to man from the first, in distinction from the doctrine that man 
is at his first existence free from sin, and that sin takes place, 
or that depravity commences, afterwards. This, I think, will be 
found to be the only fair meaning of the language which has com- 
monly been used on the subject. Accordingly, I am persuaded, 
fhat in my reasoning in chap. IV. 1 am not chargeable with any 

3 



18 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



evasion of the point at issue. Sin exists. The question is, when 
does it commence ? We say it is found in man at the beginning 
of his moral existence, or that he is sinful from the first. Unitari- 
ans say, man is at first pure, and afterwards, by the abuse of his 
faculties, becomes a sinner. The difference respects the time 
when sin commences. I know there is a further difference as to 
the degree of sinfulness. But this is distinct from the other. — 
From this view of sin, or depravity, as to the time of commence- 
ment, I proceed to show that whether sin begins earlier or later 
in the human character, it stands in the same relation to God ; 
and so conclude that the whole comes at last to the single inquiry, 
whether the existence of moral evil generally is consistent with 
the divine attributes ; — and whether its existing in a higher de- 
gree may not be as consistent, as its existing in a lower degree. 
Here the subject is brought into day light; and we reason upon 
facts and principles which are indisputable. 

Now if Dr Ware has supposed that the Orthodox doctrine 
of depravity is any thing different from this position, namely, 
that moral evil in man commences at the very time when 
moral existence commences ; I will only say, that this is what I 
have intended by it, and that it is in this light only I have under- 
taken to defend it. Let then the controversy, so far as I am con- 
cerned, be thus understood. There is frequently some confusion 
or difficulty attending the discussion of this part of the subject, 
from considering the phrases, corruption of nature, wrong affection 
or inclination, tendency to evil, &c. as meaning something which is 
not sift, and for which man is not blame-worthy. If such phrases 
are used in any intelligible sense, they must mean the real exis- 
tence of sin ovmoral evil in the human character; sin in the heart, 
forbidden by the divine law, and altogether blame-worthy and 
without excuse. They must be understood to mean substantially 
all that constitutes sin, when they are applied to human beings at 
the commencement of their moral existence, as much as at any 
subsequent period. It is surely sin for men to have a corrupt 
heart, or an inclination or tendency to transgress the divine law. 
And if this is sin at one period of human existence, why not at 
another? These remarks are sufficient to show, that the proper 
question at issue is, at what time moral evil commences in man. 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER, 



19 



DR WARE'S REMARKS AS TO THE COMMON USE OF THE TERMS SIN 
AND HOLINESS, SINNERS AND SAINTS, REGENERATE AND UNRE- 
GENERATE. 

In his Reply, p. 44, Dr Ware says ; "your impression taken 
from the common use of these terms is, that sin and holiness are 
not only opposites, but opposites in such a sense, that they can 
never exist together in the same person." He says, it is u in con- 
formity with this distinction, that all mankind are divided into two 
classes, — saints and sinners ; the former wholly righteous, the lat- 
ter totally corrupt." And this use of terms is, a little after, express- 
ly attributed to the Orthodox. But there is not an Orthodox man 
in the world that either believes this, or ever said any thing that 
implies it. The distinction which the Orthodox have uniformly 
made between saints and sinners, is, that the former have some 
holiness, mixed with much remaining sin ; while the latter are 
destitute of holiness, and so far as moral affection is concerned, en- 
tirely sinful. Thus we make a real and obvious distinction, and 
one which seems to us to be very clearly made in the word of 
God. But Unitarians affirm that sinners, as well as saints, have a 
degree of holiness mixed with sin, and so leave no room for any 
radical distinction between them. If Dr Ware should say that 
saints are distinguished from sinners, in that they have a prepon- 
derance of holiness over sin ; he will find that he has precluded 
this distinction by saying that sinners have the same preponde- 
rance. 

STATE of adam's posterity in CONSEQUENCE of his transgression. 

Dr Ware says, p ; 52, that the descendants of the first trans- 
gressor " commence their existence under circumstances of in- 
creased liabilit}' to sin, and greater difficulty in preserving their 
innocency. — Occasions of sin are multiplied, and inducements to it 
increased and strengthened." And he adds, " that any individual of 
his posterity will be far more likely, than he was, to lose his inno- 
cence," and that " there may be what we term a moral certain- 
ty" of this. I introduce this passage to show that Dr Ware's 
scheme is encumbered with as many and as great difficulties as 



20 



REMARKS ON DR 'WARE S ANSWER. 



ours, whether we consider it in relation to God's attributes, or to 
moral agency. Dr Ware thinks it inconsistent with the infinite 
goodness of the Creator to bring- human beings into existence in 
such a state, that they will from the first have an inclination or 
tendency to sin, or which is the same thing, a nature morally cor- 
rupt. He thinks this inconsistent with moral agency also. But 
does he see no difficulty in believing that the benevolent Creator 
brings his creatures into existence in a state, in which they are 
tinder such a strong liability to sin, — in which occasions of sin are 
so multiplied and inducements so increased, that there is a moral 
certainty they will all lose their innocence ? Should we not natu- 
rally expect that a being of infinite goodness would place his crea- 
tures in a different state? — or, if he placed them in such a state, 
that he would afford some effectual security against its dangers ? 
And are not those external inducements to sin, which have such 
strength that it is morally certain they will actually draw men uni- 
versally into sin, as hard to be reconciled with morai agency, as 
what the Orthodox suppose ? 

MISREPRESENTATION OF THE ORTHODOX DOCTRINE AS TO 
THE NATURAL STATE OF MAN. 

In p. 8. of his Answer, Dr Ware represents the Orthodox doc- 
trine to be this ; " That man is by nature totally depraved, incli- 
ned only to evil, and wholly incapable of any good inclination or 
motion, until such inclination or motion is produced by an irresis- 
tible act of the Spirit of God." — This Dr Ware inserts with the 
marks of quotation, as though the language had been used by me, 
or by some other Orthodox writer. Again, p 41. we find Ortho- 
doxy represented as teaching, that man is by nature " incapable 
of having a good thought, affection, or inclination, without an in- 
fluence of the Spirit which he can do nothing to obtain." And 
again, p. 43, 44 that men are utterly incapable of thinking or feeling 
otherwise than they do think and feel." Now I did hope, after 
all that had been written on this subject, that Dr Ware would 
never again invest Orthodoxy with such false colors. As to hu- 
man power, capacity or ability, understood in the pr»per sense, 
our conceptions are at least as high, as those of our opponents. 
Man has, in our view, a capability or power of doing all that God 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



21 



requires of him. His power must, we think, be as extensive as 
his duty. We constantly assert that the fault of man is not want 
of power to do his duty, but of disposition or inclination. So that 
any prejudice which is excited against Orthodoxy in the minds of 
the learned or the vulgar by such representations as those above 
mentioned, is excited at the expense of candor and truth. If Uni- 
tarians really think that the representation we make of our own 
doctrine is tantamount to the one which they are so fond of sub- 
stituting in its place, why will they not be content to make use of 
ours ? If it is not tantamount, then what apology can they have 
for putting theirs in its place ? I mean these remarks should apply 
also to the manner in which Unitarians use the words arbitrary^ 
irresistible, &c. when they undertake to describe our views of di- 
vine grace in man's conversion. It is certainly a reasonable re- 
quest which we make, that, whenever they give a representa- 
tion of our faith, they would do us the justice to use our language, 
and that they would affix to it the same sense which we do. 

Another rn; -representation of our doctrine is found p. 56, where 
Dr Ware says ; " If we are by nature totally depraved, inclined 
wholly to evil, every affection and action wrong ; what room is 
there for becoming more and more sinful ?" This is the same as 
to say, the Orthodox doctrine implies not only that all the affec- 
tions and actions of the unregenerate are sinful without any mix- 
ture of holiness, but that they are sinful in the highest possible de- 
gree. Whereas it is the uniform opinion of the Orthodox, and an 
opinion which plainly results from every right view of the philos- 
ophy of the mind, that all the affections, whether sinful or holy, 
are capable of continual increase, and that ordinarily, whatever 
excites them to vigorous exercise, actually increases their strength. 
With what reason then can Dr Ware affirm, that if we are " whol- 
ly sinful at first, any change to which we are subject, must be to* 
a less sinful state, since there would be an impossibility of chang- 
ing to one more sinful ?" just as though it were a self-evident truth^ 
that affections which are entirely of a sinful character, are forever 
incapable of rising to a higher degree of strength. 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



COMMENCEMENT OF SIN IN ADAM AND HIS POSTERITY. 

Dr Ware supposes men originally innocent and pure. How 
does he account for their becoming sinners ? He says, they make 
themselves sinners, and they do this by " yielding to temptation, by 
the abuse of their faculties, &c." It was my object to show that this 
manner of accounting for the origin of sin in individuals, is involved 
in difficulty and absurdity. The substance of my reasoning in Chap. 
V. was this. Men's yielding to temptation, abusing their facul- 
ties, &x. is itself sin. Those who commit it, are of course already 
sinners. And how does their committing sin account, for their com* 
mitting sin? Or how does their being sinners and acting as sin- 
ners, account for their first becoming sinners ? Here, 1 argued, is 
the absurdity of making a thing account for itself. Dr Ware ex- 
presses his readiness to submit to the judgment of his readers, 
whether there is any absurdity in this, referring to his former pub- 
lication, and to the beginning of Lett. V. in his last. 1 cannot en- 
large on this part of the subject, having already, in my Reply, 
given it a full proportion of time. But I must be allowed to 
offer a few remarks. 

In the first place, it seems to me strange, that Dr Ware, and 
others who agree with him, should not perceive that their mode 
of reasoning is unphilosophical. When we account for any thing 
philosophically, we assign its causes. The thing here to be ac- 
counted for is the commencement of sin in moral agents, or, the fact 
of their becoming sinners in the first instance. Now in accounting for 
this, we must assign causes, either physical or moral, which, in the 
order of nature at least, precede the existence of the effect that is 
to be accounted for. And we must certainly guard against assign- 
ing as a cause of the first sin in a moral agent, that which is itself 
sin. If we do this, besides running into absurdity, we have still 
the great question, how shall we account for this very sin, which 
by mistake we assigned as the cause of the first sin. To apply this. 
Dr Ware accounts for the fact that moral agents first commit sin, 
by their yielding to temptation, abusing their faculties, &c. But 
is not this yielding to temptation a sin ? And does this account 
for the first sin ? Then there is a sin which comes before the first. 
But passing over so plain an absurdity, we will consider this yield- 



REMARKS ON DR WARE S ANSWER. 



23 



ing to temptation or this abuse of faculties, as really the first sin. 
How is this to be accounted for ? what are the causes of this sin, 
which we have now found to be the first ? Dr Ware mentions the 
natural appetites and passions, and the various objects which are 
suited to gratify them, and which, in cases constantly occurring, 
become temptations to sin. But these temptations do not operate 
upon a man by any physical or mechanical force. He is a moral 
agent ; and whether he resists or yields, he acts as a moral agent. 
And in order that he may perform any act of a moral nature, ei- 
ther good or bad, he must come under the influence of some mor- 
al motive. JN"ow suppose the temptations addressed to his appe- 
tites and passions prevail, and in opposition to the command of 
God, he yields to them. The thing now to be accounted for is 
the fact, that in these circumstances, he does yield to temptation, 
and sin against God. What is the cause of this ? Is it the out- 
ward temptation ? But if this, by itself, is a cause of men's sin* 
ning against God, then wherever this cause exists, sin will take 
place. But temptation, by itself, is not a cause of men's sinning. 
It certainly was not a cause in relation to our Savior. Nor is it a 
cause in relation to any beings, who through the time of tempta- 
tion maintain in their own minds the temper of holiness. Temp- 
tation then, by itself, does not prevail to lead men into sin. Sepa- 
rately from their disposition, or the moral state of their minds, it is 
not a cause of sin. Separately from the temper of their minds, it 
does not produce sin. I speak here of sin in outward, visible ac- 
tion. If then temptation is in any sense a cause of men's sinning 
against God, it must be only as a part of a complex cause, the mor- 
al state of the mind, on which temptation operates, being essential- 
ly connected with it. This state of the mind is clearly of princi- 
pal consequence ; because, as we know from experience, the ef- 
fect of temptation, as an outward cause, depends upon it entire- 
ly. If this state is wrong, an act of sinful compliance takes 
place ; if right, an act of holy resistance. But it is to be remem- 
bered, that this moral temper or state of mind, considered as a 
cause, must in the present case, relate only to the outward act, 
whether holy or sinful. In regard then, to the outward act of sin- 
ning against God in complying with temptation, we have arrived 
at a satisfactory cause, though of a complex nature ; namely ; the 
existence of temptation, combined with that state of mind which 



/ 



24 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



gives temptation a prevailing force, and so leads to particular acts 
of transgression. Thus far ail is plain and certain, being perfect- 
ly agreeable to those well known principles of our nature which 
are learnt from uniform facts. We have come then to the first 
outward act of transgression, and find the cause of this to be an 
outward object, soliciting a moral agent to transgress, and a state 
or temper of mind corresponding with that outward object, and so 
leading to the actual transgression. But now what are we to say 
tf this temper of mind, this disposition to transgress, which gives 
temptation all its efficacy ? Here we find that which is sin in the 
highest sense, and that without which nothing else could be sin. 
Without a wrong affection or disposition of the mind, it is clear 
that no bodily action could be considered as sinful. And a careful 
attention to the subject will, I am sure, lead to the conclusion, 
that no volition or choice of the mind, can be considered as sinful, 
unless it is connected with a sinful disposition or affection, and 
prompted by it. If then we would go into a thorough investiga- 
tion of the subject before us, and would account philosophically 
for the very commencement of moral evil in the minds of human be- 
ings ; we must account for that wrong affection, or wrong state of 
moral feeling in the heart, in which we find that all the evil of 
bodily actions and of simple volitions really lies. 

To account for a particular act of transgression, or a particu- 
lar instance of yielding to temptation, by saying, that a human be- 
ing has natural appetites and passions which solicit indulgence, 
and that these get the better of conscience, and so lead him to 
transgress, gives us no satisfaction. It does not reach the main 
difficulty. For the very point to be investigated is, how does it 
come to pass, that the appetites and passions get the better of con- 
science ? In other words, how does it happen that a moral agent 
refuses to obey conscience, and in opposition to the divine com- 
mand, yields to the solicitation of his passions ? What is the cause 
cf his doing this ? Would he do it, if his moral state was right ? 
Does not the fact of his yielding to his appetites in opposition to 
the divine command manifestly imply a disregard of the divine 
authority, and a preference of his own gratification to the divine 
giory ? And is not a state of rnind like this sinful ? It is evident- 
ly the sum and substance of sin. Could a moral agent in any case 
yield to his appetites in some way which would imply no disre- 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



25 



gard of the divine authority, and no preference of his own gratifi- 
cation to the divine glory ; who would ever consider him as blame- 
worthy ? If a man supremely loves God, as every moral agent is 
bound to do, and prefers the divine will to his own gratification, 
whenever they come in competition with each other; it is impos- 
sible we should view any action he performs in such a state of 
mind, as sinful. We see then that temptation, bad example, and 
other outward circumstances are, by themselves, wholly insuffi- 
cient to account for an overt act of sin ; since such an act would 
never result from outward circumstances, were it *not for that 
wrong state of moral feeling, which gives those circumstances a 
hurtful influence. We come then, with double demonstration, to 
the same result ; viz ; that sin lies radically and essentially in a 
wrong state of the heart, or of moral affection ; and of course, if 
there is any such thing as the commencement of sin in a moral 
agent, it must in reality be found, not in any outward act, nor in 
any volition simply considered, but in that wrong moral disposi- 
tion or affection which gives rise to particular volitions, and to 
correspondent external actions. To account satisfactorily for the 
beginning of moral evil in man is to account for the beginning 
of wrong affection. Now does Dr Ware say any thing to ac- 
count for this ? Does he point out its appropriate causes ? The 
things which he mentions are its consequences, not its causes. As 
to any thing in human beings themselves, which is a Cause of the 
commencement of moral evil in their own minds, I know not what 
it is. The Bible does indeed teach us, that the sinfulness of man- 
kind stands in connexion with Adam's offence, as its occasion. 
But excepting this connexion, I consider the existence of a wrong 
moral disposition or state of mind from the commencement of 
moral agency, as an ultimate fact, just as much as the exis- 
tence of reason, or any of the natural appetites ; and just as the 
existence of holy affection would be, if Adam had not sinned, 
and men were from the first holy. 

But Dr Ware thinks that our considering the commencement of 
sin in the human character as an ultimate fact, and so making it 
depend on the divine constitution or agency, and not on any pre- 
vious voluntary act of man, is inconsistent with God's moral attri- 
butes, and with man's moral agency. But I ask, how, or in what 
respects it is inconsistent ? Is the commencement of moral eviL 
4 



26 



REMARKS ON DR WARE S ANSWER. 



thus understood, inconsistent with God's attributes, because it is 
dependent on his constitution or agency? But in this respect, as 
I hare already endeavoured to show, Dr Ware's scheme is liable 
to as much objection as ours. For, suppose the beginning of sin 
in man is brought about, as Dr Ware represents, by the influence of 
his natural appetites and passions, which are in themselves inno- 
cent, but in certain circumstances prove temptations to sin, and 
actually prevail to induce him to commit sin. I ask, whether 
those natural appetites become temptations, and whether those 
temptations prevail to induce man to sin, according to any laws or 
principles of his nature ? If the answer is affirmative ; then I ask, 
were not those laws or principles constituted by the Creator? and 
accordingly, does not the occurrence of sin result from his consti- 
tution? But if you say, there is no regular law or principle of 
human nature, according to which temptations produce such an 
effect ; then tell me, what gives temptations their prevailing 
force? Have they any adaptedness to produce such an effect? If 
you say, as you must, that they have ; then in what does that 
adaptedness consist? and who gave them that adaptedness ? If you 
deny such an adaptedness ; then how happens it that they pro- 
duce an effect which they are nowise adapted to produce ? Is 
it through the operation of some extraordinary cause, inter- 
vening, and thrusting in an event contrary to the established 
order of nature ? Or is it by chance ; that is, through the opera- 
tion of no cause whatever ? To say this would indeed be a sin- 
gular way of accounting for an event. But Dr Ware, in accord- 
ance with Dr Taylor and others, thinks the commencement of sin 
in man may be satisfactorily accounted for by the influence of the 
will in the use of its self-determining power. Now suppose the 
will has a self-determining power by which it produces such a 
great event. Did not God make the will, and give it such a pow- 
er? And when he made it, did he not know how it would ope- 
rate ? And did he not so constitute the will, and all the causes 
which were to act upon it, that it should of course operate just as 
it does ? Do you say, free will does not act under the influence 
of any motives, or causes, or regular laws whatever? Then I 
say, it must be a very inconvenient, unmanagable, and hazardous 
thing to reside in the mind, especially to rule there. Who 
would wish to be under such a capricious master? Who would 
not be afraid of being dashed upon rocks and quicksands, with such 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



-27 



a pilot? And yet, according to Dr Ware, God has constituted us 
in just such a manner as this ; has put us under the guidance of a 
will thus high in power, and thus capricious and dangerous in the 
use of power. But supposing it to be true that God has given 
his creatures such a will as this, and formed it to act in such a 
manner ; certainly its various movements, and the effects it pro- 
duces, must in all reason be ascribed ultimately to his design. 
Thus, on a fair consideration of the subject, it appears that Dr 
Ware's scheme makes the commencement of sin in the human 
character as really dependent on the divine constitution and agen- 
cy, as our scheme does. I see not how he can deny this, without 
running into Atheism. 

But our system in respect to the commencement of sin in hu- 
man beings is thought to be inconsistent with moral agency. I 
know not what particular charge of inconsistency can in this re- 
spect be brought against us in distinction from our opponents, un- 
less it be this ; that our system represents men to be the subjects, 
at first, of a sinful affection, which is not produced by any pre- 
vious exercise of their moral agency. Our system does indeed 
imply this. But I contend that it cannot be urged as any incon- 
sistency. For whenever a man begins to exercise moral agency, 
he has already a moral affection ; he has it in the very first exer- 
cise of moral agency ; as much as he has reason in the first exer- 
cise of rational agency. If then moral agency ever commences 
in a human being, he must of necessity have a moral affection, 
which could not have been produced by any exercise of his moral 
agency, being involved, if not presupposed, in the very first exer- 
cise. The conclusion must be, that the existence of such an affec- 
tion is so far from being inconsistent with moral agency, that it is 
essential to it. Moral agency could never begin without it. It 
could no more begin without moral affection, than it could contin- 
ue without it. But if moral affection, of one kind may exist in 
the manner above described, why may not moral affection of an- 
other kind ? If a man at the commencement of his moral agency 
may be virtuous and holy, and of course have a virtuous and holy 
affection which he did not produce by any previous exercise of 
his moral agency ; why may he not be sinful, and of course have 
a sinful affection in the same manner? 

When I assert that the early commencement of moral evil in 



28 



REMARKS ON DR WAflE 7 S ANSWER. 



in any human being, is an ultimate fact ; the assertion regards him 
merely in his personal, individual character. Accordingly, my 
meaning is, that there is no personal property or act in him, which 
can be considered as the cause of his first depravity. In this re- 
spect, his commencing his existence with a sinful nature, or the 
commencement of sin in him, cannot be accounted for. In this 
respect, nothing can, in the philosophical sense, be named as its 
cause ; and so it is an ultimate fact. But in another respect, this 
fact is truly the effect of a preceding cause. Every child of Adam 
has a relation, not an imaginary, but a real relation to him, as the 
head of the human species. On the ground of this relation the 
first sinfulness of human beings may be accounted for. In this 
way, the Bible does account for it. It teaches us, that all men 
are sinners in consequence of the offence of one, that is, Adam. 
It teaches, in other words, that God, for wise reasons, constituted 
a connexion between the conduct of Adam, and the character of 
his posterity. According to this divine constitution, which doubt- 
less had great and holy ends in view, the sin of Adam is to be re- 
garded, as the cause, in the more distant sense, of the commence- 
ment of moral evil in his posterity. I presume Dr Ware refers 
to the views I before exhibited on this subject, when he suggests 
it as something inconsistent, that I should represent the commence- 
ment of depravity as an ultimate fact, and yet, as respects the pos- 
terity of Adam, should represent it as a fact which is to be ac- 
counted for. Answer, p. 61. In the restricted sense, above ex- 
plained, I consider it as an ultimate fact. In the larger or more 
distant sense, the Apostle accounts for it, or assigns its cause. 

There is, in my view, a manifest difference, in some respects,, 
between the commencement of sin in Adam, and in his posteritjr, 
though in other respects, both events appear in nearly the same 
light. The difference referred to is briefly this. Adam began 
his existence in a state of moral purity. He was disposed from 
the first to love and obey his Creator. In this respect he differed 
from his posterity. Adam, by the exercise of holiness for a time, 
had done something towards forming a habit of holiness, which, 
together with his experience of the pleasures of holiness, 
must, we should think, have fortified him in a good degree 
against all temptation to sin. On this account, it would seem still 
more remarkable, that he should sin, than that others should sin 



REMARKS ON DR WARE 7 S ANSWER. 



29 



•at the commencement of their moral agency, when they must be 
considered as less fortified against temptation. In Adam there 
was a change from previous holiness to sit* ; while there is no 
such change in his posterity. Such is the nature of the distinc- 
tion which I have contemplated, between the two events. But 
in other respects they are obviously alike". In the first place, 
they are both equally dependent on God, and equally according 
to that wise purpose, by which he settled the great scheme of the 
universe. In this respect, all events which take place in the cre- 
ation are alike. As the system of the creation is dependent on 
God's will and correspondent to his purpose, so are all the parts 
which compose it. This necessarily results from the nature 
and condition of created beings. Secondly ; the two events 
are equally consistent with the laws of moral agency. The sin of 
Adam took place in such a way, as not to infringe any principle of 
moral agency. He was as perfectly a moral agent, and as justly 
accountable, when he first sinned, and when he began to have sin- 
ful affection, as in any previous or any subsequent action of his life, 
— as much so as it is possible any created being should be. The 
circumstance that the action or the affection was of a new moral 
character, different from any which had taken place in him before, 
made no difficulty as to the perfect exercise of moral agency. 
If, as a moral agent, he was so constituted as to be capable 
of different kinds of moral action, and moral affection, that is, 
good and bad ; then his being actually the subject of good 
and bad affections and actions and his changing from one to the 
other, was perfectly within the compass of his moral agency. 
Whether he exhibits himself in the exercise of good affection, or 
of bad affection, or in the very point of transition from one to the 
other, he exhibits himself as a complete moral agent. And if we 
would give the history of his moral conduct, or of what he did as 
a moral agent, it becomes perfectly natural and proper to relate, 
as Moses does, the story of his fall ; and the account is to be un- 
derstood in the same obvious sense as the account of any other 
sin ever committed by a moral agent. Whatever may be said of 
the agency of God, or of the usual manner in which motives pro- 
duce their effects in the mind ; it must be admitted as an unques- 
tionable truth, that Adam was perfectly a moral agent in the com- 
mencement and progress of his defection from God. In this view, 



30 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



the account which the Scripture gives of the temptation and 
apostacy of Adam, is obviously as proper and satisfactory, as the 
account it gives of human conduct in any other instance. And 
this implies that, although in the previous history of Adam's life, 
no external motives had excited any sinful desire or volition, or 
led him to any sinful action, motives might produce this effect in 
perfect consistency with his moral agency. No reasonable man 
can have any doubt as to the fact, that Adam, in the act of becom- 
ing a sinner, was completely a moral agent. The Bible speaks 
of him as such ; his own conscience condemned him as such ; and 
God treated him as such. Indeed his moral agency in that affair 
stood out to view so prominently, that men in general have felt 
much Jess difficulty respecting it, than respecting the moral agen- 
cy of his posterity, in the first stage of their existence. But as 
to this last subject, I can have no controversy with Dr Ware, as 
he abundantly asserts that men come into existence reasonable 
and accountable beings, that is, moral agents. It results however 
from the circumstances of their being, as was suggested in my Re- 
ply, that their moral agency cannot at first be visible to others ; 
cannot show itself in any distinct, decided actions ; but must exist 
in a way correspondent with the remarkable weakness of their 
state at the commencement of their intellectual and moral exis- 
tence. But as to the reality of moral agency, there is no differ- 
ence between them and Adam. 

I have now stated my views on this subject still more particu- 
larly than I did in my Reply. Some may wish me to go farther. 
But how is this possible ? I can reason about causes and effects in 
regard to the mind, as well as in regard to the physical world. 
But when I come to ultimate facts, I must stop. Any attempt to 
account for these, or to assign their philosophical causes, is folly ; 
and must lead to the various evils which have resulted from the 
hypothetical mode of reasoning in the science of physics. Ulti- 
mate facts, whether in the physical or moral world, instead of 
being accounted for philosophically, must be referred to the di- 
vine constitution. They exist, because the Author of the universe 
in the exercise of his unfathomable wisdom and goodness, so de- 
termined. This is the most satisfactory solution of the difficulty. 
This is the best resting place I can find, both for my understand- 
ing and my heart. 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER, 31 

I will only add here, that the same general views as those 
which f have expressed on the philosophy of the mind, on the na- 
ture of moral agency, and the absolute dependence of all things in 
the physical and moral world on the will of God, are maintained 
with great zeal, by those whom Dr Ware would reckon among 
the ablest and most consistent writers on the side of Unitarians. 
As to the universal agency of God, his eternal purpose respecting 
all events, and the perfect consistency between the most absolute 
divine purpose and the most perfect free agency, and as to the 
certain connexion between moral causes and effects in the mind, 
Priestley, and Belsham, and other philosophical Unitarians agree 
with us ; although they differ from us widely as to the bearing of 
these principles upon other subjects. I have mentioned this 
agreement in regard to these philosophical principles, merely to 
show, that our maintaining them ought never to be made an occa- 
sion of a popular odium against us in distinction from Unitarians. 

FREE-WILL AND SELF-DETERMINIFG POWER. 

As Dr Ware, in common with Dr Taylor and other writers of 
the Arminian school, but in opposition to the most learned and 
philosophical Unitarians, considers a free will, or self -determining 
power in man as of such great importance in the formation of 
character and the direction of moral actions : I shall examine 
the subject a little more particularly than I have done ; though I 
hope to guard against tiring my readers by any great prolixity on 
such a topic as this. 

I shall first endeavour to get as clear and definite ideas as 
possible of Dr Ware's views. He says, Answer, p. 92, 44 An agent 
implies a principle of activity, a power of acting, not merely of 
being acted upon. It is not like a pivot, upon which opposite 
weights are balanced, and which can exert no power over the 
weights themselves. An intelligent agent possesses the power of 
modifying the influences of the several powers, on both sides, by 
which it is acted upon, in such a manner, that with the same con~ 
stitution as respects the strength of the appetites and passions, and the 
power of reason, and knowledge of right and wrong, and also in the 
same external circumstances of temptation, the course of conduct 
may not be the same. He has the power of choosing between 



32 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



different courses — and of yielding to the influence of either of two 
opposite motives. — The cause therefore of this difference is the 
moral power of the agent himself or the power he has over the de- 
terminations of his own will." P. 93, u The sinner is conscious 
of ill desert, because he is conscious of having been not only vol- 
untary in the sinful act, but free ; that he had the liberty of choos- 
ing or not choosing the sinful act, and the power of actually using 
that liberty by directing his choice to either of the alternatives. 
It was in his power to submit to the influence of either the right 
or wrong motive." P. 66. u I expect to be able to show that 
beings alike by nature, and placed in similar circumstances as to 
all that is external to them, may y^et have an inherent principle 
of activity in the free exercise of which all that variety of moral 
character may be formed, which appears in the great human fam- 
ily." — u We account for the variety of character among men, b}*- 
a principle of intellectual and moral activity, in the free exer- 
cise of which, with different degrees of attention, in circumstances 
in all other respects similar, they take different directions, and ar- 
rive at all that diversity which we see in the world." 

With these passages before me, which are the most particu- 
lar and explicit of any I could find, I shall give the subject a 
brief examination. 

Br Ware attaches much importance to the freedom which he 
ascribes to the will, or to man as a moral agent. Man is u not 
only voluntary, but/ree." I am quite desirous of knowing exact- 
ly what sense he means to convey by this word. Freedom is a re- 
lative term, and must be understood according to the nature of 
the subject to which it relates. If w r e say, that one who was a 
prisoner or a slave, is free, we mean, that he is free from confine- 
ment or slavery. When the Bible speaks of sinners being made 
free, it speaks of their deliverance from the dominion of sin. But 
what is to be understood by the word, when applied to man as a 
moral agent? Is man free absolutely, and in all respects ? Then 
he is free from the influence of reason, and conscience, and common 
sense. He is free too from obligation ; for obligation we know is 
something which binds. And if man is free absolutely and in all 
respects, he is free from appetites and passions, and free too from 
the self-determining power of the will. But who would give 
the word such a signification as this ? As Dr Ware uses it in 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



S3 



relation to a moral agent, he doubtless means to use it with such re- 
strictions as the case requires. His meaning must be, not that man 
is free from the influence of reason, or of the natural appetites, or 
of the will ; but that he is free from whatever is inconsistent with 
moral agency. But how are we to learn what is inconsistent 
with moral agency ? Not by conjecture ; not by reasoning a pri- 
ori ; but by experience ; or by observation of what is fact in our- 
selves and others. To determine what is inconsistent with moral 
agency will be the same as to determine from what a man must 
be free in order to be a moral agent. Must a man, then, in order 
to be a moral agent, be free from the influence of reason ? We 
answer, no. Moral agents must have reason, and in all their 
actions, reason must have an influence upon them in one way or 
another. The influence then, of reason, or, which is the same 
thing, the influence of rational considerations, is consistent with 
moral agency. I might rather say, it is essential to moral agency. 
No one can be a moral agent without it. Now suppose that rea- 
son, (I here mean right reason.) has such an influence over a man, 
that he is at all times and in all circumstances governed by it, in 
other words, is always sure to be actuated by those considerations 
which sound reason suggests ; is this in any degree inconsistent 
with moral agency ? Certainly not. We consider a moral agent 
to be virtuous and praise-worthy, just in proportion to the degree 
in which right reason influences his mind and his actions. And 
we look upon him as deserving our esteem and confidence just in 
proportion as we believe it certain that he will continue to be 
governed by right reason. If it comes to be a perfect certainty 
in our minds, that he will be invariably influenced by sound rea- 
son; we consider him worthy of unmingled confidence. If a man, 
like the celebrated Hale, has the habit of weighing the various 
considerations which belong to any subject with great care, and if 
by suitable discipline he has brought his mind to be so nicely bal- 
anced, that in all important questions of moral duty, he weighs 
things very exactly, and is determined one way or the other by 
the superior force of rational consideration or evidence, as surely 
as the most accurate balances are moved by the superior weight : 
we all unite in giving him the honor of an accurate judgment and 
an upright heart ; and instead of considering him as robbed of any 
portion of moral agency, we congratulate him as one whose char- 
5 " 



34 



REMARKS ON DR WARE^S ANSWER. 



acter, as an intellectual and moral agent, is elevated to an unusual 
degree of perfection. The conclusion from all this is, that the 
freedom of a moral agent does not require that he should be free 
from the uniform, effectual, and certain influence of reason. In 
other words, rational considerations may uniformly exert an effec- 
tual and certain influence over his mind, in perfect consistency 
with his moral agency. An objector may say, I allow all this, if the 
influence is not necessary, or if the man is not thus influenced by 
necessity. Now to make the thing easy, let me just say, that, ac- 
cording to our views, there can be no such necessity in the case, 
as implies force, or coercion, or any thing contrary to perfect vol- 
untariness. Indeed there can be no necessity in this case, except 
the certain, invariable connexion which rational considerations 
have with a correspondent act of the mind. Now the greater 
the necessity of this kind, that is, the more certain and invariable the 
connexion between rational considerations and a correspondent 
act of the mind, the higher is the improvement and moral worth 
of the agent. To be under such influence, is moral freedom. To 
be free from such influence, is moral degradation and thraldom. 

But I must proceed farther in this inquiry. Does the freedom 
attributed to a moral agent imply that he is free from the influ- 
ence of inclination or affection? The answer is as easy as before. 
Affection is an essential attribute of a moral agent. No action 
can have a moral character, unless performed under its influence. 
And as this influence is essential to a moral agent, it may be rais- 
ed to the highest degree of efficacy, without the least infringe- 
ment of moral agency. Example. Suppose a man acts entirely 
under the control of love to God. This affection is supreme and 
constant. It occupies all his faculties. It governs his will. It 
directs his conduct. In consequence of the strength and uniformi- 
ty of character which he has attained, we may regard it as a cer- 
tainty, that he will, in every choice he makes, be absolutely un- 
der the influence of love to God. Is he not a moral agent ? Does 
this commanding, overpowering influence of holy love interfere 
with his agency? Does it interfere with his freedom? Now 
take an example of an opposite character. A man has such a 
confirmed habit of covetousness or malice, and the passion has ac- 
quired such strength, that it is a matter of certainty, that he will 
choose and act under its influence. His depraved, wicked pas- 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 35 

sion entirely governs him. Is not he too a moral agent ? We 
conclude then, that if is consistent with moral agency, for a man, 
in all his volitions and actions, to be governed entirely either by a 
good or a bad affection. 

What then is the freedom which belongs to a moral agent ? 
My answer is briefly this. It is freedom from that physical coer~ 
cion or force, which either causes actions that are not voluntary, 
or prevents those which the agent actually chooses to perform. 
So far as any man is under the influence of such physical force, 
we always consider him as deprived of moral agency. The freedom 
of a moral agent also implies a freedom from all essential disor- 
der or derangement of the rational faculties. It implies a free- 
dom from whatever would violate or suspend the general laws of 
human nature. For instance. It is a law of our nature, that a 
certain part of our bodily and mental actions should be under the 
control of the will. Now a moral agent must be free from what- 
ever would take away that control. Again. The will itself choos- 
es, or rather a moral agent chooses, under the influence of his 
dispositions or affections. This is as much a law of our nature as 
the other. The freedom essential to a moral agent implies, there- 
fore, a freedom from whatever would prevent his will from being 
influenced by his affections. The suspension of this law of our 
nature, makes a man a moral monster. He loves God with all 
his heart, and chooses to perform acts of hatred. He perfect- 
ly loves the law, and chooses to disobey it. He loves the happi- 
ness of his fellow-men, and chooses to injure them. He hates 
sin, and chooses to commit it. Or he loves sin, and chooses to 
avoid it. I say then, to be a moral agent, a man must be free 
from whatever would supersede the connexion between his pre- 
vailing affection and his volitions. I have suggested already, that 
no volition which is not connected with an affection of the heart, 
and not prompted by it, can be of a moral nature. Every man, 
who examines the judgments he passes upon his own volitions, 
will be satisfied of this. 

The freedom of a moral agent is a freedom from what I have 
mentioned above, and from every thing else of the same nature. 
But beyond this, I know not what freedom a man ever possessed, 
or can desire. If Dr Ware means any thing different from this, I 
must wait to be informed what it is. 



56 



REMARKS ON DR WARF/S ANSWER. 



But Dr Ware, as we have seen, thinks there must be " a pow- 
er of choosing between different courses, and of yielding to either 
of two opposite motives " a power of modifying the influence 
of the several powers, on both sides, &c." 

I am fully persuaded that this subject, though abstract in its 
nature, and often wrapt up in a very ambiguous phraseology, is 
yet as capable, as most other metaphysical subjects, of being pre- 
sented in a clear and satisfactory light. I have therefore been 
desirous of giving it a much more fhorough investigation, than will 
be compatible with my present limits. The design of these re- 
marks requires only a brief examination. 

Doubtless Dr Ware means to speak of a power which man 
really possesses ; a power, which we know actually belongs 
to ourselves, by being conscious of exercising it. I grant that 
man has a power of choosing between different courses, and of 
yielding to either of two opposite motives." But in what way 
has he this power ? and by what means does he bring it into 
action ? Has he the power of choosing entirely at random, 
without any motive whatever ? Has he the power of yielding 
lo one or the other of two opposite motives, without some rea- 
son for thus yielding ? I might inquire whether such a power is 
desirable. But I choose rather to inquire, whether any man real- 
ly possesses it? Is any one conscious of having ever exercised it? 

Every man has often made a choice between two different 
courses ; and every man would be inclined to say, he has had a 
reason for the choice. He has surely had some reason, otherwise 
his will must have broken its natural alliance with his rational 
faculties, and acted— I know not how, — perhaps merely to show 
its independence. If so, then this was the reason of its action. 
Every man has exercised the power of yielding to one or the oth- 
er of two opposite motives. Worldly honor has been addressed 
to him as a motive to one course of action ; the favor of God and 
the pleasures of religion, as a motive to another. These have 
been two opposite motives. He has exercised his power, and 
yielded, as I will suppose, to the influence of the latter. But had 
he not a reason for this? And was not his voluntary act of yield- 
ing influenced altogether by that reason ? If any one is disposed 
to say, that he had power in those very circumstances, to yield to 
the other motive ; my reply is, that we are now inquiring not for 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



37 



an imaginary power, but for a power which we know man pos- 
sesses, by the fact that he has exercised it. Has any man ever 
yielded to either of two opposite motives, or chosen between two 
different courses of action, without a reason ? I allow that many 
men choose without such reasons as justify their choice. But 
what man ever made a choice without some reason ? If any man 
soberly thinks he has a power to choose without being- influenced 
by any reason or motive whatever ; let him make a trial. Sup- 
pose then he is to go either to Canada, or to Mexico. There are 
some reasons in favor of Canada, and others in favor of Mexico. 
Suppose these reasons appear equal. This perhaps may give 
him a fair opportunity to show whether ha has the power in ques- 
tion. Let him then strain up the faculties of his mind to make a 
choice in the manner described, carefully guarding against having 
his choice influenced by any superior strength of reasons in favor 
of what he chooses. Most men in such a case of equilibrium 
would examine with increased care, the reasons on both sides, so 
that they might discover which was the strongest, and determine 
accordingly. And the man, who is making this experiment, finds 
himself quite inclined to do this, and actually begins to weigh the 
reasons on one side and on the other, to see which are of the 
greatest moment. But he is reminded that the object of the trial 
is, to ascertain that he has a power of choosing in a sovereign, in- 
dependent manner, without being influenced by any reason ; and 
so he rouses himself again to the effort. His will, according to its 
old habit, soon begins to lean this way, or that ; but he immedi- 
ately checks it, because he finds it does this under the influence of 
motives. By and by he says, this is likely to prove a tedious, pain- 
ful exercise. I would rather go either way than be held in this 
uneasy posture any longer. I will even appeal to the lot, as Wes- 
ley did to decide a great point in the Arminian controversy ; or, 
to make short work of it, I will turn round a few times with my 
eyes shut, and then will go North or South, just as 1 find myself 
standing, when I first open my eyes. He does this. On opening 
his eyes, he finds himself standing with his face to the South, and 
for this very reason chooses to pursue that course. It is a kind 
of factitious reason. But it is sufficient to influence a mind, which 
would not suffer itself to be influenced by any better. Let any 
man make experiments in different ways, upon himself, and he 



38 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



will always find his will pertinaciously set upon having some motive 
to influence its determinations, and even disposed to complain of a 
kind of insult, if one attempts to force it to act in any other way. 
The law of our nature for which I contend, is established by every 
instance of fair deliberation; as the object of such deliberation is, 
not to bring- the mind to choose without being governed by mo- 
tives, but to discover which are the motives that should govern it. 
If any man can be found, who has the habit of choosing without 
the influence of motives; I freely give him the credit of having a 
will vastly pliable and expert ; though it must be at the expense 
of much more estimable qualities. 

But the power of a man to put forth volitions without the influ- 
ence of motives may be tested in another way. Thus. It is pro- 
posed to him, as before, to go either to Canada or to Mexico ; 
but he has no reason or motive whatever for going either way. 
And the case is such, that he can have none, however long he 
may deliberale on the subject. Now let him try to bring his 
mind to choose between the two. Let him rouse to the highest 
pitch of energy, his self-determining power, and after that power 
has done its best, see whether he will go either one way or the 
other, unless he is carried by force. 

There is still another statement of the case. The man, as be- 
fore, is to go to Canada or to Mexico. As his circumstances are, 
all the reasons which occur, or can occur to his mind are in favor 
of his going to Canada, and these reasons are many and of great 
weight. Now let him try to exert his power of choosing inde- 
pendently of motives, and see if he can bring his will to decide in 
favor of Mexico. — If his mind is at all like mine, I predict that 
he will find no small difficulty in the way. 

When I speak of reason or motive in this discussion, 1 refer, as 
must have been evident, not only to external objects, or conside- 
rations from without the mind, but to the disposition or affection of 
the mind itself, I refer to this chiefly ; because the effect of every 
thing external to the mind depends on this. The disposition, af- 
fection, or temper of the mind is, according to the invariable law 
of our nature, the grand motive. Voluntary actions flow from it, 
as effects from a cause. They who love God, keep his com- 
mands. Their voluntary actions flow from their affections, wheth- 
er those affections are good or bad. There may indeed be a 



REMARK3 ON DR. WARE'S ANSWER. 



39 



strife among the passions or affections. One may exist, and be a 
motive, even a powerful motive, and yet may be overcome by 
another more powerful. The question of self-determining power 
in relation to this point, is, whether man has a power to choose, 
except under the influence of affection ? In moral subjects, the 
question is, whether he has power to choose, except under the 
influence of moral affection ? But the question more properly is, 
whether a man, in regard to moral subjects particularly, ever did 
actually make a choice which was not influenced by his affections 
or dispositions ? If no man ever did this, then the question of a 
power to do it is certainly of no consequence. For what can be 
the value of a power, which is never exercised ? And what 
evidence can there be of the existence of such a power. 

It seems to me very clear, that no choice or determination of 
mind, not influenced by the affections, can ever be considered as 
being either good or bad, or as having any moral character. I 
consider it therefore as a law of our nature, fully ascertained by 
facts, that every voluntary action is prompted by the disposition 
or affection of the heart, and that it is the influence of the dispo- 
sition or affection upon voluntary action, that renders such action, 
in any case, holy or sinful. 

The considerations, which prove that motives^ in the compre- 
hensive sense in which I have used the word, are the proximate 
causes of volition and moral action, are so conclusive in my mind, 
and the position is so perfectly consonant to our best views of a 
rational being, that I have been not a little surprised that any man 
could embrace a different opinion. It is certainly the common, 
not to say uniform experience of every human being, that mo- 
tives excite voluntary action, and that such action is more or less 
vigorous in proportion to the strength of the motive by which it is 
influenced. And whenever we would excite men to choose and ac?, 
our knowledge of the human mind leads us instantly to present 
motives before them, as the only way in which they can be influ- 
enced ; and as a sure way, unless the state of their minds or some 
other counteracting motive prevents. Why then should any of 
us contend for a principle, which is so contrary to our experience, 
— so inconsistent with common practice ? — a principle, which 
would in fact deprive man of the advantage of his rational nature, 
as it would require him to act in a manner utterly incompatible 
with the use of reason. 



40 



REMARKS ON DR WARE S ANSWER. 



If my opponents think my remarks out of place, because they con- 
tend as well as we, that reason is to be exercised in all the actions of 
inen ; my reply is, that men exercise reason no farther, than they 
govern their choice and their conduct by motives. If by the free- 
dom of the will, or the self-determining power, for which they 
plead, they intend nothing- but this, that a man has power to de- 
liberate ; that his will is influenced, not by compulsion, but by ra- 
tional considerations ; that being wholly free from constraint, he 
will always choose and act, as motives prompt; then there is no 
ground for dispute. When any of us speak of moral or philoso- 
phical necessity, a term which I have wished wholly to avoid in 
this controversy, we mean nothing more than the constancy and 
certainty of the connexion, just stated, between motives and vol- 
untary action. 

But I must not quit this subject, without a more particular ex- 
amination of Dr Ware's scheme, as exhibited in the quotations 
above made from his Answer. u An agent,"" he says, " implies a 
principle of activity, a power of acting, not merely of being acted 
upon." I fully agree to this ; only having it understood that the 
power of acting which belongs to a moral agent, is a power to 
act according to the laws of a rational and moral nature ; in other 
words, to act under the influence of motives. In this way, and in 
this only, has man power to act, as a moral agent. Our author 
says farther; u an intelligent agent possesses the power of modi- 
fying the influences of the several powers, on both sides, by which 
it is acted upon, in such a manner, that with the same constitution 
as respects the strength of the appetites and passions, and the power 
of reason, and knowledge of right and wrong, and also in the same 
external circumstances of temptation, the course may not be the same." 
I know not that any objection lies against this. As an advocate 
for the general doctrine of moral or philosophical necessity, I ad- 
mit, nay, I affirm, that two men may have 41 the same constitution 
as respects the strength of the appetites and passions, and the 
power of reason, and knowledge of right and wrong, and may al- 
so be in the same external circumstances of temptation and yet 
that they may pursue different courses of conduct; because, 
though alike in all these respects, they may be totally unlike as 
to moral principle, or the reigning affection of the heart. The 
constitution of men, as respects the strength of their natural appe- 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER* 



41 



tites and .passions, has no necessary connexion with their moral 
affections. For though a man's natural appetites and passions are 
strong, and are the occasion of many a dangerous temptation, as 
Paul's and Peter's were, he may have a holy affection strong 
enough to resist his passions, and overcome temptation. This holy 
affection is the prevailing motive. Again. Two men may be 
alike as to " the power of reason, and knowledge of right and 
wrong," and yet be totally unlike as to moral affection. Accord- 
ingly, although alike as to power of reason, and knowledge of 
right and wrong, their conduct, prompted by different moral affec- 
tions, may be widely different. The same as to external circum- 
stances of temptation. One who is exposed to them, may have a 
strength of holy principle which will lead him uniformly to guard 
against them ; another may have a depravity of heart, which will 
lead him to sinful compliance. All this is conformable to common 
experience. All this results from the laws of the human mind. 
Though in ail the respects mentioned by Dr Ware, men may be 
alike, they may pursue very different courses, because they may 
be under the influence of very different internal motives. If this 
is what Dr Ware means by " the power of choosing between dif- 
ferent courses, or of yielding to the influence of either of two op- 
posite motives ;" we fully agree with him. We have exer- 
cised such a power every day of our life. We have chosen be- 
tween two different courses. We have yielded to the influence 
of one or the other of two opposite external motives, just accord- 
ing to our predominant inclination or affection. And we have 
done the same with regard to those internal motives, which arise 
from our various natural appetites and passions. There may be 
a principle in the human raind^ superior to all motives of this 
character. In every good man there is such a principle. He 
loves Christ more than any earthly object, and in comparison with 
him, counts all things loss. Under the influence of this holy affec- 
tion, which constitutes his character as a Christian, he denies him- 
self, takes up his cross, and is willing, when duty requires, to suf- 
fer and die. 

We assert too, that men have what Dr Ware calls " the pow- 
er of modifying the influences of the several powers, on both 
sides," by which they are acted upon, so that in similar circum- 
stances, so far as he describes them, they may choose different 
6 



42 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



courses, according to their predominant disposition. We always do 
modify the influence of all other motives by the grand motive, the 
reigning affection of the heart. 

In all- the passages above referred to, Br Ware has fallen 
short of a full statement of the case. The point at issue between 
him and Calvinists is not, whether two men, who are alike in some 
respects, and are acted upon by man}' similar motives, can choose dif- 
ferently; but whether they can choose differently when the y are alike 
in all respects, that is, when all the proper antecedents of choice are 
the same ; in other words, when all the external and all the internal 
motives to volition are the same. A difference in the prevailing af- 
fection of their minds, whatever else is alike, will always cause a dif- 
ference of volition. But suppose every thing which has the nature of a 
motive is the same in both ; then what can be the cause of a dif- 
ference of volitions ? This is the question. We say, there nev- 
er was any difference in such circumstances ; that there never can 
be ; and that to assert it, is to assert that an effect exists without 
a cause. Dr Ware is, however, of another opinion. He says 
" the cause of this difference is the moral power of the agent him- 
self, or the power he has over the determinations of his own 
will." Again he says more explicitly ; " we account for the va- 
riety of character among men, by a principle of intellectual and 
moral activity, in the free exercise of which, with different de- 
grees of attention, in circumstances in all other respects similar, they 
take different directions, &c." The case to which he means to 
refer in this reasoning, must be one where all the motives to voli- 
tion are the same, and yet a difference of volition takes place. I 
understand that he accounts for the difference of volition in such a 
case not by any difference of motives influencing the choice, but 
by " the power which the agent himself has over the determina- 
tions of his own will." — But it is clear that a man-s having a pow- 
er does not account for the particular use he makes of it. If you 
should ask the cause, why one man goes, or chooses to go to 
Great Britain, and another to Otaheite ; you would think it a 
strange answer for me to say, the cause is, that they have power 
to go to either place, as they please. Their having power was 
indeed necessary to their going at all. But that power, possessed 
equally Iry both, was no reason why one of them should choose to 
go to Great Britain rather than to Otaheite, or the other to Ota- 



REMARKS ON DR WARE 7 S ANSWER. 



43 



heite rather than to Great Britain. If effects require causes, a 
difference of effects requires a difference of causes. In the cir- 
cumstances of similarity described by Dr Ware, the fact that men 
choose different courses is ascribed to this cause, namely, the pow- 
er they have over the determinations of their own wills. But 
how can their power be a cause without acting ? And how can 
the same act of power in two cases, where all the other circum- 
stances are also the same, be the cause of different effects ? These 
different effects, all will allow, must be produced by different acts 
of power. So far there can be no doubt. But as to these differ- 
ent acts of power; had they any cause ? Or did the two men put 
them forth without any reasons or motives ? My opponents would 
be loth to say this. Because if there are any acts of the mind, of 
which there is no philosophical cause, they must be ultimate facts, 
and so must depend entirely on the divine constitution. But my 
opponents would hardly admit that those different exercises of 
power, which aecount for different courses of voluntary conduct, 
are thus immediately dependent on God. They must say then, to 
be consistent, that those different acts of power have no cause 
whatever. They must say so, because they think this circum- 
stance essential to moral agency. Thus then the case stands. 
Men's activity, or the power they have over the determinations of 
their own will is, Dr Ware says, the cause of different volitions. 
But it can be a cause in no other way, than by action ; and it can 
be a cause of different volitions in no way but by its different ac- 
tions. Now if you say, that those different actions are al- 
ways influenced by motives, you are a Calvinist. If you say, they 
are not, you say what plainly implies that they are neither good 
nor bad, and that those who put them forth no longer act as ra- 
tional beings. Thus that very self-determining power, which was 
thought an essential part of moral agency, proves, on inquiry, to 
be its destruction. 

If it be said again, that man, thus entirely under the control of 
motives, external or internal, is under the influence of necessity ; 
my answer is, first, that the very supposition precludes physical 
necessity. Secondly, man is indeed under the necessity of being 
a rational and moral agent, and of acting as such. He is bound 
to this by the constitution given him by his Creator. He must be 
a rational and moral agent. And he must be influenced in all his 



44 



IlEMfARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



actions in a manner suited to his rational and moral nature. This 
is all the necessity 1 assert. But this necessity, 1 acknowledge, ia 
such, that no choice of a moral nature ever did take place, or ev- 
er can, without a motive. Minor motives, of various kinds and 
various degrees of strength, are constantly modified and overcome 
by one great, governing motive. But to say that man modifies 
these minor motives by one of superior strength, and that he has 
power to do this, is very different from saying, that he chooses or 
acts, or has power to choose or act in any other way, than as im- 
pelled by the most powerful motive. 

After the foregoing remarks, which have been extended to a 
much greater length than I at first designed, the remaining par- 
ticulars in Dr Ware's statement may he quickly disposed of. 

" The sinner," he says, "is conscious of ill desert, because he 
is conscious of having been not only voluntary in the sinful act, 
but free." We assert too that the sinner is conscious of being 
free, that is, free from physical force or coercion, and free from 
mental derangement ; free in short, from every thing which 
would suspend the laws of his intellectual nature, and every thing 
too which would prevent him from acting according to his choice, 
or from choosing according to motives. In such respects as these, 
he is free ; and freedom of this kind is essential to his moral ac- 
countableness. But after all, that which renders him criminal is 
the fact that he has a wrong disposition or affection of heart, and 
chooses and acts under its influence. So that, strictly speaking, 
the sinner's Hi desert does not in any measure consist in his being 
voluntary and free, because voluntariness and freedom, ac- 
cording to Dr Ware's own representation, belong no more to 
him, than to one who is free from sin. His ill desert must consist 
in something which distinguishes him from one who is holy. And 
what is this but the fact, that he chooses and acts under the in- 
fluence of a wrong motive, while one who is holy, chooses and acts 
under the influence of a right motive. The power of choosing 
right or wrong makes him a moral agent. His actually choosing 
wrong makes him a sinner. And this choice is the thing to be ac- 
counted for. 

When Dr. Ware says, it is in a man's u power to submit either 
io the right or wrong motive," he says that which may indeed be 
very true, but which is after all very ambiguous, because it does 



REMARKS ON DR WARE 7 S ANSWER. 



not describe the case fully. A man may have two particular mo- 
tives set before him, for example, a motive to speak the truth, 
and a motive to lie. But these two particular motives may not 
comprise every thing which can influence his determination. The 
grand motive may lie in the disposition or affection of his own 
heart. He may fear God ; and this pious affection may give effi- 
cacy to the particular motive which prompts him to speak the 
truth. Or he may have some selfish affection, which will give 
efficacy to the other motive, and lead him to speak falsehood. 
It appears then that, besides those two motives, between which he 
is to decide, there are other motives, namely, the dispositions of 
his own mind, which, according to the law of his nature, must ulti- 
mately govern his choice. So that to say he has power to yield 
to the one or the other of those two particular motives, seems to 
be only saying, that he has power to govern himself by a still 
more powerful motive than either, namely, the prevailing affec- 
tion of the heart. But no man ever chose and acted contrary to 
that which was the prevailing affection of his heart at the time. 
To say therefore, that a man has power to yield to either of two 
opposite motives, leaving out the consideration of that inward mo- 
tive which controls all others, is but a partial account of the sub- 
ject, and so exposes our reasoning to no small perplexity. 

The following passage, quoted above from Dr Ware's Answer, 
is liable to the same objection. It does not fully describe the 
case under consideration. He says he expects " to show that be- 
ings alike by nature, and placed in similar circumstances as to all 
that is external to tkem, may yet have an inherent principle of ac- 
tivity in the free exercise of which all that variety of moral char- 
acter may be formed, which appears in the great human family." 
He says in a parallel passage, that it is in the free exercise of this 
principle, that men, in circumstances in all other respects similar, take 
different courses. But what does he mean by this inherent principle 
of activity ? If he means the predominant affection or disposition of 
the heart, then the sentiment is, that in similar circumstances in all 
that is external to them, men will be prompted to pursue different 
courses by this predominant affection ; or that this affection is the in- 
herent principle of activity, in the free exercise of which they take 
different directions. To this view of the subject we fully accede. 
But if Dr. Ware means a principle of activity, which leads men in 



40 



REMARKS ON DR WARE S ANSWER. 



any case to choose and act otherwise than their predominant af- 
fection prompts them to do : then I must wait for him to show 
that there is such a principle or power in human nature, or that 
the supposition of such a principle can be reconciled with any just 
views of moral agency. And while the subject is under consider- 
ation, it may be a satisfaction to him to review Edwards's Treatise 
on the Will, and Priestley's on Philosophical Necessity. For myself, 
I can account very satisfactorily for the different courses men pur- 
sue, and the variety of character which they exhibit, by the in- 
fluence of external circumstances in connexion with the particu- 
lar affections or dispositions of their own minds. I know that 
these circumstances and these affections have always influenced 
my own conduct: and I expect they alwaj^s will. Nor do I know 
any other power or principle which ever did influence, or ever 
can influence the choice or actions of man. 

I fear 1 have carried this discussion to an irksome length. But 
I shall be willing to bear the reproach of some repetition and pro- 
lixity. If I may but help to clear away the difficulties which have 
surrounded a subject of so much importance, and prepare the 
minds of any of my readers for more just views of mental philos- 
ophy. 

WHETHER A PROPENSITY TO SIN IS SINFUL. 

In my Reply, I represented the very essence of sin as consist- 
ing in a propensity, inclination, or disposition to sin. Dr Ware 
thinks that a propensity to sin is not sinful, and implies no guilt. 
In my apprehension, as well as in Dr Ware's, the dispute on this 
point arises in a great measure from the fact, that we "annex dif- 
ferent ideas to the word propensity." 1 By propensity to sin Dr 
Ware evidently means nothing but 44 the natural appetites, affec- 
tions, and passions," such as 44 a strong appetite for intoxicating li- 
quor, irritability of temper, and strength of passion." Now I am 
as read}' as Dr Ware, to affirm, that these, considered as original 
properties of human nature, are not sinful, and imply no guilt. 
But I doubt much as to the propriety of calling any of these a 
propensity or inclination to sin. These ma}- all exist in one who is 
entirely obedient, in heart and in life, to the divine law. A man's 
hunger and thirst, however strong, are not, in themselves, sinful, be- 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



47 



cause they have not a moral character. In their own nature, they 
are neither obedience nor disobedience. But in certain circum- 
stances, eating and drinking are prohibited by him who made us ; 
that is ; we are in certain cases forbidden to gratify our natural ap- 
petites. Here our moral nature is brought into view. In these cir- 
cumstances we are called to the exercise of our moral agency, 
which implies a moral affection or disposition. What then is our 
moral affection ? In other words, are we inclined to obey, or to 
disobey the command of God ? This inclination or propensity to 
act in view of the divine command, in other words, this inclination 
or propensity to obey or disobey God, is what I mean by inclina- 
tion or propensity to holiness or to sin. Dr Ware speaks, Answer, 
p. 84, of a man's being withheld by the fear of God from yield- 
ing to temptation ; of his religiously abstaining from the indulgence 
of his passions ; and of his exercising a virtuous principle. Now 
this fear of God, this virtuous and religious principle, is, in such a 
case, the grand governing principle of action ; and this is what I 
mean hy a propensity or disposition to acts of holy obedience. 
But if a man, in such a case, has a propensity or disposition to 
disregard the divine command, and to pursue the gratification of his 
own passions, as his highest object, he has what I mean by a pro- 
pensity or disposition to sin. This disposition or propensity, be- 
ing of a moral character, is itself sinful ; yea, it is what every 
one must consider as the very essence of sin. Being a moral 
agent, as well as a. physical agent, man must be capable of a moral 
propensity or inclination, as well as a physical one. The moral 
propensity is what I speak of ; and it is what I naturally should 
speak of, when treating of man as a subject of moral law. Pro- 
pensity to sin, taken in this obvious sense, must be considered as 
sinful, by every one who admits the existence of moral good and 
evil. There is no way in which men more frequently describe 
the character of one whom they consider as really criminal, in 
distinction from those who are not really criminal, than by saying, 
he has a disposition or inclination to do wrong. 

The sum of what I wished to say on this topic is this. If pro- 
pensity to sin is taken to mean what it naturally means, that is, a 
moral propensity, an inclination or affection of a moral nature j it 
is certainly sinful. The very existence of such an inclination or 
affection is sin, or there can be no such thing as sin in the world. 



48 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



If it is said, the sin consists in yielding to temptation ; my reply is, 
that such yielding- never takes place without a disposition to yield, 
and that this disposition, after all, constitutes the sin of yielding. 
For if a man should yield to temptation, without any disposition to 
yield, he would manifestly be blameless. But if propensity to sin 
is used to denote any of those appetites and passions which are 
essential to our animal, social, or intellectual nature ; then cer- 
tainly it is not, in itself, sinful; and it becomes sinful only when a 
man is led by a disposition which is morally wrong, to give it an 
improper or forbidden indulgence. In other words, it becomes 
sin only when it is brought under the influence of a real propensity 
or disposition to sin. . 



DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDETERMINATION. 

Having given so much attention to this subject in my Letters 
and Reply, and having labored to place the Orthodox doctrine in 
as perspicuous a light as possible, I hoped there would be no oc- 
casion for my returning to the subject again. I find however sev- 
eral passages in Dr Ware^s Answer, pp. 120 — 127 which seem to 
require a brief consideration. 

He says, u I admit that no unforeseen occurrence can take place ; 
but does it hence follow, that no event not predetermined can take 
place ? That may be foreseen, respecting which there is no de- 
termination." In p. 95 he compares the divine foreknowledge to 
that knowledge which we have of an event ; and if I mistake not 
he does, in some other passages, argue that God may foreknow 
what will take place without determining it, because we may. 

In order to a just investigation of this subject, it is important 
fo keep in mind, that every event which takes place, is depen- 
dent on its proper causes ; a physical event on physical causes ; and 
a moral event on moral causes. An event in the moral world is 
distinguishable from an event in the physical world, not as being 
less dependent on its proper causes, but as being of a different na- 
ture, and dependent on causes of a different nature. It is as com- 
mon, and it is surely as important, to inquire for the proper causes 
of a particular instance of murder or suicide, as for the causes of 
the tides or the trade winds. The conduct of Peter in denying 



REMARKS ON DR WARE r S ANSWER. 



4& 



Christ, of Judas in betraying* him, and of Pilate in delivering him 
up to be crucified, proceeded as really from appropriate moral 
causes, as thunder or the rainbow proceeds from appropriate phys- 
ical causes. 

To come to the particular subject above introduced ; 1 may 
know that an event will hereafter take place, from the knowledge 
I have of its causes, or of the regular laws of nature respecting it. 
Thus from my knowing what are the causes of an eclipse, I know 
that an eclipse will at such a time take place. In the same way 
I know that in certain circumstances I shall see the rainbow. I 
may also know that an event will take place, because I have been 
informed of it by one who is entitled to my perfect confidence. 
Now it is manifest that whether my knowledge of a future event 
results from my acquaintance with the causes of that event, or 
from the declaration of those who possess higher intelligence 
than I do, it does not necessarily imply any predetermination or 
design in me respecting the event. And why does it not ? I an- 
swer, because neither the occurrence of the event, nor the caus* 
es of it depend in the least measure on me. It will take place 
without my determination or agency. But if the event depends 
on my voluntary agency as its cause, my foreknowledge of the 
event implies design or purpose. For example. If the products 
of my field depend on my agency in planting and cultivating it, 
then my knowing what the particular products will be, or wheth- 
er there will be any products at all, must imply that I have a de- 
sign respecting them. I cannot know that there will be a crop of 
wheat unless it is my purpose to sow wheat. This then I must 
consider as an obvious principle ; that just so far as any future 
event, or its cause, is dependent on my voluntary agency, my fore- 
knowledge of the event implies that I have a purpose or design 
respecting that agency, from which the event is to proceed. 

It is equally true that events in the moral world have their 
appropriate causes. If those events are to take place without 
any dependence on me ; then my foreknowing them implies no 
purpose or design in me. I foreknow them as depending on caus- 
es, which are entirely under the control of another. But if any 
events in the moral world, or their moral causes, are dependent 
on me, my foreknowing them implies that I have a design respect* 
ing them. 

7 



50 REMARKS ON DF, WARE'S ANSWER. 

The general principle above stated is capable of as clear proof 
as any truth in natural science. And it applies, in all its extent, 
to the subject under consideration. All events in the natural and 
moral world are effects, and dependent on their appropriate caus- 
es. Those causes are dependent ultimately on God. He consti- 
tuted the connexion between them and their effects. The whole 
n of physical and moral causes was appointed by the all wise 
Creator. His knowledge of the effects implies a knowledge of 
their causes. And his knowledge of causes and effects which de- 
pend on him, implies that he has a purpose or determination re- 
specting them. 

The conclusiveness of the argument which supports our theo- 
ry is perfectly obvious, if all events in the physical and moral 
world do reallj^ depend on physical and moral causes. But if they 
do not depend on physical and moral causes, they must either be 
ultimate facts, and so depend immediately on the agency of God 
without any secondary causes, as creation did; or they must be 
selfexisiettt. But no man of sober understanding can believe either 
sse. If according to the scheme of my opponent, events in 
the moral world depend on the self-determining power of man's 
will as their proper cause ; it affects not the strength of the pres- 
ent argument. For surely no one can doubt that this cause, as 
well as all others, was appointed by God, and that the connexion 
which it has with its effects is just what he determined it should 
be. To say, that God created man's will and endued it with a 
power to act in such a manner, and that he knew exactly how it 
would act under the influence of all the causes which would ope- 
rate upon it, and yet that it was not his design that it should act 
thus, would be strangely absurd. For if it was not his design that 
it should act thus, why did he form it in such a manner, and place 
it under the operation of such causes, as he knew would lead to 
such a result. 

From the view we have taken of the subject, it becomes, I 
think, very evident, that Dr Ware's attempt to make a separa- 
tion between the divine foreknowledge and the divine purpose is 
unsuccessful. The foreknowledge and purpose of man may in- 
deed be separate, except when the events foreknown depend on 
his purpose and agency. But as the whole system of things, the 
whole series of causes and effects in the natural and moral world. 



REMARKS ON Dr'wARe's ANSWER. 



depends on God's will ; his knowledge of future events is nothing 
but the knowledge of what will result from those very causes 
which he himself has appointed and put in operation. If there 
were any event in the creation, which did not result from causes 
appointed and regulated by God ; I acknowledge he might fore- 
know that event, without any determination or purpose respecting 
it. But nothing like this can be found in the universe. The 
whole system of created things depends on God's will. And he 
foreknows the events which are to occur in that system, as result- 
ing from their proper causes, — causes which he appoints. And 
this is only saying, he foreknows them truly, or foreknows them 
exactly as they are. 

Dr Ware says, Answer, p. 121, " that the simple foreknowl- 
edge of God has no influence in producing the event foreknown. 
It has no relation to the causes, whether physical or moral, by 
which it is to be produced ; but only to the certainty of the event." 
The event then, according to what is implied in this very passage, 
is to be produced by proper causes, either physical or moral. 
Foreknowledge does not produce the event, because it does not 
produce its proper causes. Those causes depend not on God's 
knowledge. On what do they depend '? We say thej r depend on 
God's will. And the short proof we give is this. They are eith- 
er independent and self-existent causes ; (which no one will say ;) 
or they depend on the will of some intelligent being ; and that 
being must be GoS, or some creature. If they depend on a crea- 
ture, that creature depends wholly on God ; and so those causes 
still ultimately depend on God. It comes then to this; it is not 
God's foreknowledge, but an act of his will, that produces the 
causes of the event foreknown. They result from his appoint- 
ment. Thus he foreknows the event, as depending on its proper 
causes; and he foreknows those causes as depending on his ap- 
pointment. In this way, Dr Ware's representation that foreknowl- 
edge does not produce the event foreknown, nor the causes of 
that event, helps us to prove the necessity of something which 
does produce them, which must be an act of God's will. 

But Dr Ware tries to relieve the difficulty by this representa- 
tion. " The purpose of God is not a purpose that beings endowed 
with certain powers shall perform certain specific acts ; but that 
they shall be exposed to certain influences, to the operation of cer- 



52 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



tain motives, and that certain consequences shall follow the choice 
they freely make.— It is not, that Peter or Judas shall actually make 

this choice, and pursue this course ; but thus, Peter shall have 

the power of choosing and pursuing this or the opposite course, and 
according as he shall pursue the one or the other, he shall be re- 
warded or punished." — " It was predetermined that the being in 
question should act freely, not that it should perform the specific 
act which it did perform." 

According to this, God determines that men, constituted as 
thej' are, 44 shall be exposed to certain influences, to the opera- 
tion of certain motives," which are the only causes of volition ; 
but he does not determine what shall be the effect of those caus- 
es. He determines every thing but the choice which men actual- 
ly make. He determines to make them just such beings, to put 
them in just such a situation, to expose them to the operation of 
just such causes ; and he perfectly knows what will be their choice 
under the influence of those causes ; but he does not determine 
what that choice shall be. — All this appears to me just as absurd, 
as to assert that God determines the causes of the rainbow, 
but not the rainbow itself — that he determines the causes of an 
earthquake, but does not determine the earthquake. The con- 
nexion between moral causes and effects is as certain as between 
physical causes and effects. And it is as utterly inconceivable, 
that God should determine the causes without determining the ef- 
fects, in one case as in the other. But Dr Ware says ; ;t it was deter- 
mined that the being in question should act freely." But how? Did 
God determine that he should perform the free act which he does 
perform ? No. Did God determine that he should perform any oth- 
er free act? No. How then ? It must be thus. God determin- 
ed that he should act freely, — but 44 not that he should perform 
the specific act which he does perform," nor any other ; — deter- 
mined that he should act, and, if he should happen to act in this 
way or that, that he should nctfreely ; — or determined that he should 
<LCt freely, if he should act at all, though that was left quite unde- 
cided. Let us examine this statement in relation to Pilate. It 
was determined that he should act freely* whether he released 
Jesus, or delivered him up to be crucified. But God knew that 
he would deliver up Jesus. And if, when God determined that 
he should act freely, he had his eye upon any particular act, it 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



S3 



must have been upon the one which he knew would be perform- 
ed. Accordingly, if God determined that he should perform any 
act whatever, or that he should act at all, he must have determin- 
ed that he should perform the particular act which he did per- 
form. This is the question to be decided ; did God determine that he 
should perform that specific act ? Dr Ware answers, God did not 
determine this. But Peter and John give a different answer. 
They say, Acts iv. 27, 28, that Pilate and the other enemies of 
Christ were gathered together, to do whatever the hand and counsel 
of God had determined before to be done ; or as Schleusner renders 
it, — what in his pleasure and will he had decreed to be done. 
Show what they actually did, and you show what God had deter- 
mined should be done. 

So we say in all cases. God determined that men should act 
freely in the very manner in which they do act ; or that they 
should perform those very free acts which they do perform ; as 
there is no other conceivable way in which God could either de- 
termine that they should act at all, or appoint the moral causes 
that should influence them. But the statement of Dr Ware is 
strange and enigmatical. God determined that men should act 
freely ; but not in that particular way in which they do act, nor 
in any other way particularly, but in some way indefinitely, not 
implying any specific act whatever. Accordingly, if men should 
carry God's determination into effect exactly, they would act, it 
seems, and act freely, but would perform no one particular act af- 
ter all ; because, though action was determined, it was such action, 
if such there be, as implies no particular act. 

To me it is a subject of astonishment, that my opponents are 
not impressed with the frequency and the explicitness with which 
the Scriptures assert the doctrine which I maintain. The inspir- 
ed writers teach that God, in a thousand thousand instances, pre- 
determines the good and bad actions of men, as well as the moral 
causes of those actions, and the ends to be answered by them. It 
would be impossible for me to express this doctrine in stronger or 
more unequivocal language, than that which the Scriptures use to 
express it. Why then do men, professing to believe the Scrip- 
tures, reject the doctrine ? Simply, because they think it incon- 
sistent with man's moral agency, and with God's attributes. But 
I have never seen a particle of proof that it is inconsistent with 



54 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER* 



either. It is most evidently as consistent with God's attributes, as 
it is to determine the general system of the moral universe ; for 
the general system is a nonentity, except as it is made up of par- 
ticular parts. And the system of causes, which all will allow God 
has put in operation, is an empty sound, except as it includes those 
effects which result from it. And as to moral agency, there is not 
a single thing belonging to it, which is infringed by our doctrine. 
Nay ; that determination and agency of God on which all moral 
causes and effects depend, directly establish and preserve moral 
agency. I will engage to show that there are as many and as 
great difficulties attending moral agency, from God's foreknowl- 
edge, as from his purpose. For Dr Ware owns, that it is obvious- 
ly impossible for the fact not to be, which is foreknown. But it is 
said, divine knowledge does ndt make it impossible. True. But 
there is some cause of its impossibility. And what is that ? — God's 
foreknowledge implies also a certainty of the event foreknown. 
But it is said, it does not cause that certainty. True again. But there 
is a cause of that certainty. The event could not be certain, did 
not something make it certain. Now what is the cause of the 
certainty of the event which is foreknown ? Show the cause of 
the impossibility which Dr Ware allows in the one case, and of the 
certainty he allows in the other, and you show all that our doc- 
trine contains, inconsistent with moral agency. ' 

To conclude this article. What has taken place in regard to 
the doctrine of the divine purpose, strikingly exemplifies the truth 
of a remark before made ; namely; that men are led, by the con- 
sideration of difficulties which they cannot solve, to reject doc- 
trines supported by the clearest evidence. The evidence, both 
rational and scriptural, on which this doctrine rests, is as near de- 
monstration, as the evidence of metaphysical or moral truth in any 
case whatever. And I cannot but think it unworthy of those, who 
boast of inquiring freely and independently after the truth, and of 
following boldly whithersoever it may lead, to suffer themselves 
to start back from a doctrine resting on so firm a basis, and to be 
governed by misconceptions which a thorough examination might 
quickly correct, or perplexed with difficulties which the light of 
divine truth might enable them fully to solve. 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



55 



CURSORY OBSERVATIONS. 

I have thought it best, thus far, to confine myself to the dis- 
cussion of particular topics. I shall now make a few brief re 
marks on passages which I find here and there in Dr Ware's An- 
swer, without any regard to order. 

Dr Ware speaks, p. 69. of " the strain of popular eloquence 
which runs through" a part of Chap. 6 in my Reply. He says, 
" nothing is more easy than thus to turn an adversary's argument 
or opinion into ridicule by a broad caricature ;" and he under- 
takes to repel the ridicule by showing how a similar strain of 
irony may be applied to the opposite opinion. Now the differ- 
ence between the two cases is this. My object as stated p. 1 i6, 
was to try the correctness of the principle which Dr Ware's rea- 
soning involves, by showing what must follow from the admission 
of that principle. I did not mean to give a caricature. I aimed 
not at ridicule or rant, but sober argument. I supposed then, and 
still suppose, that I pointed out the real consequences of Dr 
Ware's opinion. And it would certainly have been well for him 
to show, at least in some important particulars, that his opinion 
does not lead to such consequences. This, however, he does not 
attempt. But instead of this he makes an effort to degrade Ortho- 
doxy by a strain of irony and sarcasm in which he does not even 
pretend to regard justice or truth. I say he does not pretend to 
do this. For after he has given such sportive license to his pen, 
he tells us with his customary frankness, pp. 74, 75, that he does 
not mean what he has written 41 should be taken for serious argu- 
ment ;" and makes an apology, for "adopting such a strain of levity," 
and " thereby violating the decorum he intended to observe." This 
very honorable apology forbids the remarks 1 should otherwise 
have offered on the pages referred to. 

Dr Ware denies that Pharaoh. Jeroboam, and Judas can be 
considered, as examples of human nature. He says, p. 66, U I 
might with as much propriety mention Moses, David, and Paul, 
as examples of human nature ; for, so far as moral character is in 
question, we have no more evidence, that they owed theirs to the 
special influence of the Spirit of God, than that the others owed 
their opposite characters to a special influence." I have quoted 



a6 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



this passage for the purpose of showing- to what lengths Dr Ware's 
scheme of religion has carried him. He thinks there is no more 
reason to say that Moses, David and Paul had any special influ- 
ence of the Spirit in becoming pious, than Pharaoh, Jeroboam, 
and Judas had in becoming impious ; in other words, that men of 
the most depraved and most hateful character are as really in- 
debted to a special influence of the Spirit for the formation of their 
character, as the most virtuous and holy are. According to this, 
the vilest men have as much reason to thank God for giving them 
his special influence to excite them to wickedness, as the most 
godly have to thank him for giving them his special influence to 
excite them to holiness. And if the views above exhibited are 
correct, it must, for ought 1 can see, be just as suitable for a wick- 
ed man to pray for the special influence of the Spirit to help him 
commit sin, as for a good man to pray for that influence to help 
him do his duty. I am well persuaded that Dr Ware would shud- 
der at the thought of such consequences. He could not follow 
his assertion into these obvious results, without doing violence to 
every principle of piety. He could not do it without forgetting 
the language of gratitude and devotion, which he must have re- 
peated hundreds of times, both in public and in private. 

There is a passage, p. 125, which requires some attention. I 
had urged, in my Reply, that no injustice is done to those who are 
left to remain in sin and perish, because they receive no more 
than what they deserve. They are punished only according to their 
ill desert. Dr Ware says ; " this might be urged with a sem- 
blance of justice, were the sinfulness in question their own act, 
and not the act of God." He means to assert, that, according to 
the Orthodox theory, the sins of the wicked are not their own 
acts, but the acts of God. But upon what grounds does he assert 
this? The first is, that, according to the Orthodox theory, sin- 
ners are in that condition, in which they were placed by their 
Maker. In regard to this, I have already shown, again and again, 
that Dr Ware's theory makes man as really dependent on God, 
and attributes his sins as really to God's agency, as the Orthodox 
theory. 1 could easily prove in this place, if it were necessary, that 
the whole constitution of man, and all the laws or principles which 
govern his actions, and all the circumstances which attend him, 
are the wise appointment of God ; that man is a being of such 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



57 



properties, that he is a moral agent, a proper subject of law ; that 
his moral actions are truly and entirely his own; as really so when 
they commence in early life, as afterwards ; that in perfect con- 
sistency with his dependence on God, he has all the properties 
which can belong to a created moral agent, and that his moral ac- 
tions have all the properties which can make him justly responsi- 
ble for them ; that they are as much his own acts, are as volunta- 
ry, as free, as deliberate, and involve as complete and unshackled 
an exercise of his intellectual and moral powers, as upon any oth- 
er theory. Indeed, it appears perfectly clear to my mind, that 
there is no theory which makes so clear and perfect a distinction, 
as the Orthodox, between the actions of God and the actions of 
men, or between holiness and sin, or which gives so just and satis- 
factory a view of moral agency. 

The other particular reason which Dr Ware suggests for the 
representation above referred to, is this ; that according to the 
Orthodox theory, the common grace granted to all is not sufficient 
to render it possible for them to become holy, the influence of the 
Spirit which is necessary to their sanctification being withheld. 

On this I remark, first, that we assert the possibility of men's 
becoming holy, in every sense in which such possibility is neces- 
sary to the most perfect moral agency. We assert it in the plain, 
literal, proper sense. But there is a sense in which Dr Ware 
himself denies it to be possible that that should be, which God 
foreknows wiil not be. If he should here assert, what he often 
suggests, the final holiness and salvation of all men, the difficulty 
would still remain. For there are some men who are very sinful 
at present, and God knew they would be sinful; and according to 
Dr Ware, p. 95, it is of course impossible for them to be other- 
wise than sinful. And yet he considers them moral agents, justly 
chargeable with the criminality of their conduct. Now we assert 
no impossibility of man's becoming holy, which is attended with 
any more difficulty in relation to the present subject, than that 
which Dr Ware asserts, and which every sober man must admit. 

I remark, secondly, that it is not what is usually called the in- 
fluence of the Spirit, or the grace of God, either common or spe- 
cial, that makes men capable of good and evil, and renders it righ- 
teous that God should punish them for their sins. They are made 
moral agents, and justly accountable for their actions, bv the es- 
8 



68 



REMARKS ON DR WARE 7 S ANSWER. 



sential attributes of their minds; by the rational and moral facul- 
ties which belong to them, as human beings. In consequence of 
God's giving them and continuing to them such minds, such ration- 
al and moral powers, it is proper that they should be placed un- 
der law, and recompensed according to their conduct. Whatever 
other favors are bestowed or withheld, men, in all circumstances 
and at all times, are fit subjects of moral government, while they 
possess those faculties which constitute them moral agents. We 
represent them as possessing all those faculties, and as being in 
circumstances which give to those faculties the most perfect ex- 
ercise. 

Before Dv Wnre has done with this point, he repeats, perhaps 
the tenth or twentieth time, what I am sorry he ever repeated 
once ; 1 mean that vulgar charge, which contains too much appar- 
ent truth to be directly denied, and yet too much falsehood to be 
admitted, namely, that we represent men to be as God made them, 
totally depraved, incapable of any good till renewed by irresistible 
influence, — irreversibly appointed to destruction without any re- 
gird to their sins, &c. 1 shall not stop to animadvert upon this. 
But there is one passage in the same paragraph, p. 126, on which 
I must detain the reader a moment. And I do it to show again, to 
what results Dr Ware is carried by his scheme of religion. He 
says; "if it is clear that God did not determine to regenerate 
men from any foresight of repentance and good works, it must be 
equally Certain that he did not appoint the unregenerate to per- 
ish, from any foresight of their impenitence and sins." The prin- 
ciple which is clenrly implied in this passage, is, that those who 
are regenerate as really deserved regeneration for the good works 
they performed before regeneration, as those who are finally im- 
penitent deserve to perish for their sins. God's foreknowledge and 
determination must correspond with facts, or regard thir.gs as they 
are. So that, if it is as certain that God determines to convert or 
si'.ve men from a foresight of their good works, as that he deter- 
mines to destroy men from a foresight of their sins ; then he does 
actually convert or save men as much from a regard to their good 
works, as he destroys men from a regard to their sins. And if 
God actually bestows the blessing as much on account of good 
works, as he inflicts the punishment on account of sins; it must be 
that the righteous are as really deserving of salvation, as the wick- 



REMARKS ON DR WARE S ANSWER. 



59 



ed are of destruction. How this can be reconciled with the feel- 
ings of the humble Christian, with the common language of devo- 
tion, and with the strong and explicit declarations of the New 
Testament on the subject, I must leave to be made out by those 
who feel competent to the task. 

At the close of the paragraph, p. 127, Dr Ware tells his read- 
ers, that my saying in one sentence that men are ordained to 
wrath for their sins, and in another, that the elect are chosen with- 
out any foresight of faith or good works as causes moving to the 
choice, is not the less inconsistent for having been stated by the 
Westminster Divines. I only add, that it is not the less consistent 
for that. 

The views exhibited pp. 128 — 133, on the subject of means 
and privileges, are not, I think, such as can be defended. In my 
Reply, I had suggested that Dr Ware's position as to the sove- 
reign appointment of men to privileges and means is attended with 
as great difficulties as the Orthodox doctrine. In his Answer, p. 
128, he thus briefly states my reasoning; " If privileges are grant- 
ed to some in distinction from others, which are designed to pro- 
duce, and do in fact to a certain extent produce, a sanctifying in- 
fluence upon their character ; where is the difference, as to the 
general difficulty, between this, and the direct and immediate ap- 
pointment to holiness itself ?" He answers very decisively, " that 
the difference is the greatest possible ; the one being entirely 
consistent, the other utterly inconsistent, with moral accountabili- 
ty." Suppose now the divine appointment in this case to be ex- 
actly correspondent with fact. Thus; God appoints that privileg- 
es shall be granted to some in distinction from others, and that to 
a certain extent those privileges shall in fact produce a sanctify- 
ing influence. God's appointment was that the thing should be 
just as it is. Does such a divine appointment make it otherwise 
than it is ? And if the divine appointment makes the thing, and 
leaves it, as it is in fact, how is that appointment more inconsis- 
tent with moral accountability, than the thing itself? My oppo- 
nents will allow, that if the divine conduct in any case is just and 
consistent, the divine purpose agreeing perfectly with that con- 
duct, is equally just and consistent. In this case, some men's hav- 
ing distinguished privileges, which to a certain extent do really 
produce a sanctifying influence, that is, render men holy, is an in- 



130 



REMARKS ON DR WARE S ANSWER. 



stance of the divine conduct. It is a fact in divine providence. 
The divine purpose is that this fact shall be just as it is, that is, 
that those very men shall be made holy, and be made holy in the 
very manner in which they are made so. The fact, by itself, is 
allowed to be consistent with moral accountability. Is it any the 
less so because it agrees with the divine purpose, or because God 
determined it should be just as it is? If any one supposes the di- 
vine purpose to be something not thus exactly agreeing with fact, 
he labors under a great mistake. And if he supposes, that the di- 
vine purpose is not as consistent with moral accountability and 
with every thing else, as the fact which perfectly corresponds 
with that purpose; this mistake is as great as the other. 

I have allowed myself repeatedly to enlarge on this subject, 
perhaps beyond due bounds, because the Orthodox doctrine has 
appeared to me perfectly plain, and rational, and scriptural, 
and every way honorable to God, and I have been desirous of do- 
ing all in my power to clear away the mist which has invested it, 
and to bring others to view it with as perfect a conviction of its 
truth, and with as high enjoyment, as I do myself. I am the more 
desirous of this, because 1 have known too well the unhappiness 
of being pressed and agitated with the very difficulties, which 
lead my opponents to reject the doctrine. 

Dr Ware, p. 85, refers to a passage in my Reply, p. 136, in 
which I acknowledge myself chargeable with a mistake. I said ; 
" We cannot accede to Dr Ware's notion, that disciplinary punish- 
ment may be inflicted by a righteous and benevolent God, without 
real ill desert in those who suffer." The word suffering should 
have been used instead of punishment. On reading the observa- 
tions of Dr Ware, I was surprised at my inadvertency ; and the 
more so, because I had been used in my own reflections to mark 
the obvious distinction between suffering and punishment. 

Dr Ware's attempt, pp. 153, 154, to point out. the fallacy of 
the reasoning in my Repty, pp. 220, 221, has much plausibility; 
and I was ready to conclude on first attending to his remarks, that 
I had made a partial representation of his views. But a thorough 
examination has convinced me that my reasoning, with a little 
modification, is just and conclusive. Dr Ware had said; "Love 
to Christ will depend on our view of the nature and value of the 
benefits we receive through him, and not at all on the rank he 



REMARKS ON DR WARE^S ANSWER. 



61 



holds in the scale of being." This I represented as implying, 
that our love to Christ will be the same, both in kind and degree, 
whether he is possessed of mere human perfection, or of divine per- 
fection ; and this, as implying that human perfection is entitled to 
as high a regard, as divine. Dr "Ware, in his Answer, endeavours 
to show that my reasoning is without any force, because it cannot 
be supposed that we receive the same benefits from man, or from 
any created being, as from God. It is obvious that my reason- 
ing had no reference to the benefits received through Christ, 
which were mentioned by Dr Ware as the sole ground of our love 
to him, but merely to his unguarded assertion, that our love to 
Christ does not depend at all on the rank he holds in the scale of 
being. I should have pursued a more proper course, had I first 
admitted that the consideration of the benefits received from 
Christ is indeed of great importance in exciting our love, but 
that this is not the only thing concerned; that the consideration 
of his own personal excellence, or the rank he holds in the scale 
of being is also of great importance, and that denying this leads to 
such absurd consequences as I described. For if our love to 
Christ does not depend at all on his rank in the scale of being, 
then clearly, whether his rank be that Of a man or a God, our 
love to him, so far as that rank is concerned, should be the 
same. It might be of special importance to show also, that the 
consideration of his own personal excellence, or his rank in 
the scale of beings, cannot be separated from the consideration 
of his benefits ; as it would be absurd to suppose that any crea- 
ture can bestow such benefits, as come from the Creator. But 
from a view of all which Dr Ware has written on the subject, I 
am led to think he did not mean, absolutely, that our love to Christ 
does not depend at all on his rank in the scale of being, but that 
it does not depend on this primarily, that this is not the chief con- 
sideration. Had he said this, my remarks would have been dif- 
ferent, though I should still have thought the sentiment excep- 
tionable. 

But there is no end to controversy in this form ; and I would 
rather my reasoning should be left in that awkward condition, in 
which it is made to appear in some of the minor criticisms of my 
antagonist, than to weary my readers and myself by extending my 
rejoinder to any greater length. 1 determined at the commence- 



62 REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 

merit of these remarks, to confine myself to the discussion of those 
points, on which the decision of the controversy must depend. There 
are indeed hundreds of passages which I have not noticed, some 
on the practical influence of the two systems, some on the Atone- 
ment, and some on other points, which are, in my view, liable to 
strong objections. And I find it requires no small effort of self-de- 
nial and magnanimity, to leave all those passages without any re- 
mark, especially where I am satisfied I could easily make their 
weakness or absurdity visible to every reader. 

In Dr Ware's last publication as well as in the former, there 
are many remarkable instances of fairness and candor in contro- 
versy, and many indications of sincerity and kindness, which I have 
noticed with great pleasure, and which cannot fail to excite feel- 
ings of personal respect and attachment towards him in the minds of 
all unprejudiced readers. But every new examination of the sub- 
ject of controversy adds new strength to my conviction, that the 
system which he has labored so zealously to defend, is radically 
erroneous, and of fatal tendency, and that the system which he oppo- 
ses, is the truth of God. The religious system set forth in his 
publications, and in the writings of the most respectable Unitari- 
ans in this county and in Europe, overlooks the rained state of man. 
This is the grand, fundamental error of Unitarians. And we can 
have no expectation that they will accede to our views respecting 
the grace of God in redemption, the design of Christ's death, the 
work of the Hoty Spirit, the eternal purpose of God respecting 
the extent of salvation, and other kindred doctrines of God's 
word, so long as they entertain such an opinion as they now do, of 
man's native purity and goodness. But if they should be feeling- 
ly convinced, as I hope through the mercy of God they will 
be, that all men are by nature totally sinful, and totally ruin- 
ed, children of wrath, and that God would be perfectly just 
and holy should he leave them without exception to perish 
forever; they would have little difficulty in respect to the 
other doctrines which our system contains. This conviction 
of sin and ruin gives a fatal blow to pride and self-compla- 
cency ; it leads to repentance and faith, and is the basis of evan- 
gelical religion. It must be obvious even to our opponents, that 
such a conviction necessarily involves the belief of the other doc- 
trines with which it stands connected in our system. And it is 



REMARKS ON DR WARE'S ANSWER. 



63 



very obvious to us, that where this conviction is wanting-, there 
will be a thousand difficulties and perplexities respecting the doc- 
trines of Orthodoxy. The controversy appears, in this view, to 
be as much a matter of feeling, as of reasoning ; and it ought to be 
treated accordingly. 

Having now closed my remarks, I would bend the knee in 
earnest prayer to God, in behalf of myself and my opponent, that 
whatever is erroneous in our views of religion may be corrected; 
that whatever has been wrong in our mode of conducting this con- 
troversy may be forgiven; and that what we have both written 
may be made subservient to the cause of truth and love. 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: May 2006 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724) 779-2111 



